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 Preface
In 1959, C.P. Snow (1905-1980) addressed a growing problem in the academic world. Even 
though many intellectuals in his time came from similar social backgrounds, were comparable in 
intelligence, and made roughly the same incomes, he noted a schism between the two groups of 
intellectuals.  There was,  on one hand,  a community of  scientists  and,  on the other hand,  a 
community of literary intellectuals. These “two cultures” had their own intellectual, moral and 
psychological atmospheres that resulted in distinct attitudes, standards, patterns of  behavior, 
approaches, and assumptions for both groups. As result of the differences, these intellectuals had 
almost  ceased  to  communicate  with  each  other  at  all.1 Scientists  were  disinterested  with 
Shakespeare in equal proportion to those literary intellectuals who were unversed in the laws of 
thermodynamics; each culture was distinct in both method and rationality from the other. For 
Snow, both sides became self-impoverished through this segregation. The literary intellectuals 
were concerned that scientists were quickly becoming illiterate and, vice versa, the scientists 
accused the literary intellectuals of innumeracy. Consequentially, the greater Western cultural 
horizon was denied possible intellectual breakthroughs because these two camps could not work 
together. 2 
The human sciences, in particular, were a battleground of academic cultural warfare. Only 
one year after C.P. Snow's “Two Cultures” lecture, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) released a 
compilation of  his essays called  Signs.  In an essay entitled “The Philosopher and Sociology,” 
Merleau-Ponty began by reaffirming Snow's observation:3
1 Snow, C.P.. “The Rede Lecture, 1959.” The Two Cultures: And a Second Look. London, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1959. Print. 169
2 Snow 172
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty. “The Philosopher and Sociology.” Signs. Trans. Richard C. McCleary. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964. Print. 98
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Philosophy and sociology have long lived under a segregated system 
which has succeeded in concealing their rivalry only by refusing them 
any  meeting-ground,  impeding  their  growth,  making  them 
incomprehensible  to  one  another,  and  thus  place  culture  in  a 
situation of permanent crisis.
The thrust of Merleau-Ponty's argument in “The Philosopher and Sociology” is that the study of 
society cannot remain an exclusive cultural acquisition of the scientist; philosophy, despite being 
a family member of the humanities, has much to say about the study of culture. The broad aim 
of this paper is to show both why and how the two cultures should be united. This will be no easy 
task: the culture of science, after all, is deeply entrenched into our natural attitude. An analysis 
of our cultural history, its twists and turns, will illuminate our cultural present. 
In November of 2010, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) made revisions to 
its  long-range  plan.  These  changes  have  been  highly  controversial  in  the  anthropology 
community because the new long-range plan omits any mention of the word 'science.' As a result 
of the change, a rift within the community has become apparent. There are anthropologists who 
disagree with the changes to the long-range plan and consider their research under the banner of 
science. They believe that the omission of 'science' from the long-range plan is an abandonment 
of the core principles of the association. The changes have been welcomed by a few, however, 
who envision a more inclusive anthropology that takes other knowledge systems into account – 
including the rationality of the humanities. 
The long-range plan is a mutable document that establishes the long term goals of the 
association. The long-range plan before 2010 made it clear that the “purposes of the Association 
shall  be  to  advance  anthropology  as  the  science that  studies  humankind  in  all  its  aspects, 
through archaeological, biological, ethnological, and linguistic research.”4 After the changes in 
4 “Long-Range Plan.” American Anthropological Association. 23 Nov. 2010. Web.     Footnote continues...
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late 2010,  however,  the long-range plan makes no mention of  advancing  anthropology as a 
science.  The edited  long-range plan states  that the purpose of  the association “shall  be to 
advance the public understanding of humankind in all its aspects.”5 The changes imply a shift in 
focus; the new long-range plan does not specify the goal of anthropology as the generation of 
knowledge. Instead, the changes are more supportive of anthropology as a medium for advocacy. 
Even the research domains that were listed in the older long-range plan have been scrutinized 
and transformed. The long-range plan goes on to cite new domains of anthropological research 
including “social, cultural, political, historical, medical, and visual” research.6 The AAA argues 
for the changes by affirming that,  in order to understand the complexity of  cultures across 
history, anthropology “draws and builds upon knowledge from the social and biological science 
as well as the humanities and physical sciences.”7 Ethnology, in particular, is absent from the 
amended  long-range  plan  and  its  subject  matter  has  been  fragmented  into  more  general 
categories of humanistic study. These transformation of traditional anthropological topics from 
scientific pursuits to more general  studies,  some argue,  is tantamount to the destruction of 
anthropology altogether.  Carl Lipo, a professor of  anthropology at California State University 
asserts that the changes to the long-range plan “basically makes it necessary for those who 
believe that there are ways of generating theory-laden falsifiable accounts of the world in terms 
of culture...must work under a different banner than anthropology.”8 Professor Lipo's assertion is 
supported by Stu Plattner,  the former director of  the Cultural  Anthropology Program of  the 
The current version can be found at <http://aaanet.org/about/Governance/Long_range_plan.cfm >.
A version of the LRP with the additions underlined and the deletions in strikethrough can be found at 
<http://www.unl.edu/rhames/AAA/AAA-LRP.pdf >.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 “What is Anthropology?” American Anthropological Association. Dec 2010. Web. 
<http://aaanet.org/about/WhatisAnthropology.cfm >
8 Carl Lipo. “Whither Anthropology as a Science?” Evolution Beach Blog. 26 Nov. 2010. Web. 
<http://www.evobeach.com/2010/11/whither-anthropology-as-science.html>
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National Science Foundation. He argues that the changes are “another step in the conversion of 
anthropology from a social science into an esoteric branch of journalism.”9 
The controversy over the change to the long-range plan hinges on the importance of 
scientific practice within our culture.  Many practicing anthropologists believe that the word 
'science'  comes with cultural  and intellectual  respectability.  Even if  the new long-range plan 
emphasizes advocacy over knowledge generation, Raymond Hames, the anthropology chair at 
the University of  Nebraska, Lincoln, argues that the changes undermine the anthropologist's 
ability to advocate for effective change. “Science,” he argues, “has a special currency in courts, 
public opinion, and in the legislative process. If we purge science from our mission statement we 
lose our credibility,  the ability to advocate for effective change,  and hence our power to do 
good.”10 He fears that anthropology will become “just another special interest group.”11 The power 
of  science to effectively advocate is  founded  on its  presumed  intellectual  rigor and lack of 
political agenda. Another professor, Murray Leaf of the University of Texas at Dallas, reinforces 
Dr. Hames' argument. He agrees that the AAA's cultural clout is connected to its public image as 
a scientific institution. By rebranding the Association through changing the long-range plan, the 
AAA is effectively “speaking with the authority of science but without actually bothering to do 
the work and exercise the critical restraint of science.”12 Moreover, with science comes federal 
research money. Other thinkers argue that the change to long-range plan jeopardizes the flow of 
funding to anthropology programs around the nation13. In short, the 'scientific' anthropologists 
9 Stu Plattner, quoted in “No Science, Please. We're Anthropologists” by Alice Dreger. Psychology Today. 25 Nov. 2010. 
Web. <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/fetishes-i-dont-get/201011/no-science-please-were-anthropologists>
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Murray Leaf, quoted in “Anthropology Association Rejecting Science?” by Peter Wood. Chronicle of Higher Education. 
29 Nov. 2010. Web. <http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/anthropology-association-rejecting-science/27936>
13 Ibid.
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want to retain their credibility in the public sphere by sticking to the term 'science,' regardless of 
the possibility that the humanities might have substantial contributions to the understanding of 
humankind. The more inclusive conception of anthropology is just “the play of opinion across 
ever-changing  circumstances,  and  becomes  virtually  indistinguishable  from  popular  myth, 
collective misunderstanding, political credo, and even sheer propaganda of one sort or another.”14 
The changes did not go undefended. A few academics defended the changes by arguing that the 
'science-free'  mission  statement  no  longer  prioritizes  the  rationality  of  science  “above  the 
knowledge  systems  of  the  very  people  we  have  been  studying.”15 Carl  Dooglas,  a  doctoral 
candidate at the University of South Florida, claims that we must recognize that there are “other 
means of knowing, exploring, and explaining.”16 These other means have been neglected both 
intellectually  and  economically  and  it  “well  past  the  time  for  this  to  change.”17 The 
anthropologists  who  are  open  the  revisions,  however,  have  not  convinced  the  scientific 
traditionalists. The rift between the scientific and the humanistic anthropologists manifests in 
the social configuration of academic conferences. The American Anthropological Association's 
annual events are colloquially called 'the meetings,' plural, because anthropologists “go and meet 
with their own actual disciplinary types, in separate groups, so that the real scientists don't have 
to deal too much with the fluff-head cultural anthropological types who think that  science is 
just another way of knowing.”18 The anthropology community is polarized between those who 
view science as the only rigorous way to go about explaining humankind and those who view 
14 Ibid.
15 Carl Dooglas. “Anthropology as Science.” Recycled Minds Blog. 26 Nov. 2010. Web. 
<http://recycledminds.blogspot.com/2010/11/views-from-anthill-anthropology-and.html>
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Alice Dreger. “No Science, Please. We're Anthropologist” Psychology Today. 25 Nov. 2010. Web. 
<http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/fetishes-i-dont-get/201011/no-science-please-were-anthropologists>
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science as just one of  many possible ways of  understanding humankind. Even if  the label of 
science comes  with  more cultural  authority  and  economic support,  those who support the 
change believe that the more inclusive conception of anthropology is less culturally imperialistic 
and is more reflective about the scope and limitations of scientific practice. 
In this paper, I will approach the debate over the long-range plan from two angles. Firstly, 
I want to understand how science came to dominate our intellectual discourse in such a way that 
it is considered to be a requirement for effective advocacy and sufficient funding. In order to 
understand how science became the only rigorous way of knowing, one must look at the history 
of  science and,  in  particular,  its  relationship with  philosophy.  I  support  Edmund  Husserl's 
argument that  the nature of  contemporary science is  a  residue of  the interaction  between 
philosophy and science. An analysis of this history reveals that science need not be an exclusive 
form of knowledge generation; at an earlier time, the two disciplines of science and philosophy 
were united under a common task. Secondly, I want to explore these other means of “knowing, 
exploring,  and  explaining.”  I  will  question  the validity  of  the scientific  method  in  making 
explanations about social phenomena. My criticisms of the social sciences rest upon the notion 
that social science misconceives the nature of social inquiry. As a result of these criticisms, I am 
lead to ask whether or not there can be an alternative that overcomes the problems specific to 
social  phenomena  and  I  will  validate  phenomenology  as  an  alternative  approach  to  social 
inquiry.
 The 'two cultures'  model that was formulated by C.P. Snow is not a diagnosis of  the 
disease, but merely an awareness of a symptom. Science relies on a method that abstracts from 
individual phenomena the general character of the universe. This general character is expressed 
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in  terms  of  physical-chemical  explanations.  Since  inquiries  into  the  social  world  require 
knowledge of the natural world, it is a common assumption that the knowledge produced by the 
natural  sciences is  primary and fundamental  to the knowledge of  the social.19 In effect,  the 
application of  the scientific method has become an exclusive source of  genuine knowledge 
generation. Science has become the ultimate arbitrator of truth and falsehood, hence why the 
greater Western cultural horizon, which relies on fact-minded science, produces merely fact-
minded people with little interest in other forms of knowing.20 The sciences have not always, 
however, taken this particular cultural configuration. A large portion of this paper is dedicated to 
the elucidation of earlier cultural configurations that existed for science. Over time, the sciences 
have lost sight of their ultimate task and original sense. I intend to make this task and this sense 
clear. Before this project can be undertaken, it must be stated that in returning science to its 
original  sense I  am not discrediting the accomplishments of  hundreds of  years of  scientific 
research and production. In fact, it is only out of the deepest respect for scientific practice and 
humanity's well-being as a whole that a reconceptualization is required. 
 I  don't  believe that Einstein  had  a crisis  of  rationality  in  mind  when he said,  “the 
unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus 
drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”21 Nevertheless, he feared a science run amok and that is 
precisely the state of science and culture today. Instead of the looming threat of nuclear war, 
there is the looming threat of the suffocation of alternative knowledge systems as a viable and 
alternative form of rationalizing. The result of a complete disconnection between the sciences 
19 Edmund Husserl. “The Vienna Lecture.” The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An 
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970. 271
20 Edmund Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970. 6
21 Need citation
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and other forms of  rationality is the self-impoverishment that C.P. Snow warned about, or as 
Husserl puts it, “it means nothing less than the loss of faith 'in himself,' in his own true being.”22 
We seek to return science to its original sense by reminding the greater Western cultural horizon 
that science is  “a title for spiritual  accomplishments...[and]  like all  spiritual  occurrences,  [it 
belongs] to the region of what is to be explained by humanistic disciplines.”23 As philosophers, it 
is our obligation as functionaries of  mankind to attend to this true being by remedying the 
schism between the sciences and these other forms of rationality. We are concerned with what 
science had meant and could mean for human existence.24 
1 – The Theoretical Attitude and The Birth of Science in 
Philosophy
The relationship between the sciences and philosophy has not always been antagonistic; 
natural science and philosophy were once inseparable in principle and unified in attitude. It was 
only after the failures of modern metaphysics that science was decapitated. In this section I will 
follow  along  Husserl's  historical  program  in  The  Crisis  of  the  European  Sciences  and  
Transcendental  Phenomenology to illustrate that both science and philosophy have changed 
since their inception in  Ancient Greece.  The ever-increasing  'mathematization'  of  nature,  a 
notion that will  be discussed shortly,  gave birth to a conception of  scientific knowledge that 
ultimately becomes disconnected  entirely from lived  experience.  The alienation of  scientific 
knowledge from lived experience has become the hallmark of contemporary scientific practice 
and perpetuates the aforementioned crisis  in the human sciences.  Moreover,  this  schematic 
22 Husserl, Crisis 13
23 Husserl, Vienna 273
24 Husserl, Crisis 5
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history of  science is necessarily a history of  philosophy. The philosophical  inadequacies that 
festered in the modern period will become apparent..
 The birthplace of both science and philosophy was the Ancient Greek civilization during 
the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.E.25 An unprecedented approach to understanding nature 
arose from the poleis in the form of a new sort of attitude. The philosophical attitude sublimated 
into  cultural  formations  that  challenged  traditional  conceptions  of  nature.  The  traditional 
conception of  nature for Ancient Greece was both a practical  and a spiritual  world.  Husserl 
characterizes their 'surrounding world' as a locus of their cares and endeavors that integrated 
spiritual  and historical  structures.26 Pre-philosophical  Greeks were “naively,  straightforwardly 
directed at the world, the world being always in a certain sense consciously present as a universal 
horizon  without,  however,  being  thematic  as  such.”27 This  dynamic  between  the  spiritual, 
historical,  and  intentional  worlds,  however,  motivated  both  individuals  and  groups  of 
individuals to reorient themselves towards nature in the form of a new attitude. In other words, 
“to make the world itself thematic, to take up a lasting interest in it.”28
An  attitude  is,  for  an  individual,  a  “habitually  fixed  style  of  willing  life  comprising 
directions of the will or interests that are prescribed by this style, comprising the ultimate ends, 
the cultural  accomplishments  whose total  style is  thereby determined.”29 Attitudes establish 
cultural norms, since the “constant directedness toward a norm inhabits the intentional life of 
individual  persons,  and  thence the nations  with  their  particular  social  units...”30  The pre-
philosophical attitude was essentially directed towards practical matters; men took interest in 
25 Husserl, Vienna. 276
26 Ibid. 272
27 Ibid. 281
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. 280
30 Ibid. 276
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the world insofar as it could benefit them. The philosophical, or theoretical attitude, which arose 
out of the pre-philosophical attitude, however, is thoroughly unpractical.31 Husserl suggests that 
this new attitude, disconnected from practical matters, came about as “a variant of  curiosity, 
which has its original place in natural life...when one's quite immediate vital needs are satisfied 
or when working hours are over.”32 Unlike the pre-philosophical attitude, the theoretical attitude 
is an end in itself. The Ancient Greeks were “gripped by the passion of a world-view and world-
knowledge that turns away from all practical interests and...strives for and achieves nothing but 
pure theoria.”33 The theoretical attitude is focused on ideas and establishing new cultural norms 
through  the  application  of  ideas.34 Thus  from  its  inception  the  theoretical  attitude  was  a 
revolutionary new way to change cultural practices. 
The theoretical attitude in Ancient Greece led to a self-consciousness regarding their own 
traditional  cultural  practices  and  a  consciousness  of  the  cultural  practices  of  others.  Early 
philosophers observed the multiplicity of pre-philosophical 'surrounding worlds,' each with their 
own practical interests and world-view, and distinguished between these world-representations 
and a singular, unified actual world. They sought to establish a theoretical world that contains 
truths which are “valid for all who are no longer blinded by tradition, a truth-in-itself.”35  Prime 
examples of this sort of knowledge are the Platonic Forms, Euclidean Geometry, and Aristotelian 
Syllogistics.  Those who lived  philosophical  lives,  that  is  to  say lived  lives  unbounded  from 
tradition and whose infinite task was the establishment of universal knowledge, communalized 
into a new cultural configuration. Communities of philosophers inspired non-philosophers who 
31 Ibid. 282
32 Ibid. 285
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 277
35 Ibid. 286
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were sympathetic to the cause, if unable to pursue the vocation themselves. Additionally, Husserl 
argues that “unlike all other cultural works, philosophy is not a movement of interest which is 
bound to the soil of the national tradition.”36 Philosophy, as an interest in universal knowledge, 
was able to transcend cultural boundaries and interest foreigners as well as Greeks. Philosophy as 
a cultural entity had a twofold effect on the Ancient Greeks: first, the impractical vocation of 
philosophy became acceptable as a cultural formation and, second, philosophers were allowed to 
broaden their community through a cross-cultural movement in education. As a result, there was 
a 37 
far-reaching  transformation  of  the  whole  praxis  of  human 
existence:...the whole of  cultural  life...must receive its  norms not 
from  naive  experience  and  tradition  of  everyday  life  but  from 
objective truth. Thus ideal truth becomes an absolute value which, 
through the movement of education and its constant effects in the 
training  of  children,  brings  with  it  a  universally  transformed 
praxis....if  the general idea of  truth-in-itself  becomes the universal 
norm of all the relative truths that arise in human life, the actual and 
supposed situational truths, then this will also affect all traditional 
norms, those of  right, of  beauty, of usefulness, dominant personal 
values, values connected with personal characteristics, ect.
Philosophy was originally an attitude that questioned traditional values in the light of new ideas 
and an entirely new culture, guided by the notion of universal knowledge, was formed as a result. 
It should be noted that this new culture was not completely devoid of  traditional  concepts; 
merely,  that  Ancient  Greek  society  after  the  proliferation  of  the  theoretical  attitude  was 
characterized by a tension between the upheaval of traditional values and the establishment of 
new cultural practices in respect to critically analyzed ideas.
In the introduction to this section, I explained that Husserl's historical program in the 
36 Ibid. 286
37 Ibid. 287
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Crisis is a history of both philosophy and science simultaneously. As a history of philosophy, it is 
fairly straightforward; the rise of the theoretical attitude led to the cultural formulation of the 
vocation of  philosophy and consequentially transformed traditional  cultural  practices out of 
respect for universal, ideal norms. It is not clear, however, how this  Geschichte pertains to the 
development of science. 
Both science and philosophy are breeds of the theoretical attitude. A scientific experiment 
“produces  in  any  number  of  acts  of  production  by  one  person  or  any  number  of  persons 
something  identically  the  same,  identical  in  sense  and  validity.”38 Hence  the  hallmark  of 
scientific practice, experimental repeatability, betrays the true nature of  scientific discoveries: 
“what  is  acquired  through  scientific  activity  is  not  something  real  but  something  ideal.”39 
Science's affinity for ideas is not the only characteristic of the theoretical attitude shared with 
philosophy:  both are impractical  insofar that they require a complete conceptual  revision of 
traditional  understanding and require the agent to keep a disinterested posture towards the 
world.40 Moreover, as theoretical vocations and through their respective methods of  research, 
both produce more and more refined ideas, which demand more and more time away from the 
practical life. Science can take the fruits of its research and use it “as material for the possible 
production of idealities on a higher level, and so on again and again.”41 In fact, science “signifies 
the idea of an infinity of tasks, of which at any time a finite number have been disposed of and 
are retained as persisting validities; these make up at the same time the fund of premises for an 
infinite horizon of tasks as the unity of one all-encompassing task.”42 This task was also the task 
38 Ibid. 278
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 285
41 Ibid. 278
42 Ibid.
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of philosophy. Philosophy “sees in the world the universe of what is, and the world becomes the 
objective world as opposed to representations of the world, those which vary according to nation 
or individual subject; thus truth becomes objective truth.”43 Science, likewise, sets its notion of 
truth apart from traditional notions of truth. Science “wants to be unconditioned truth,” truly 
universal and beyond reproach except from itself.44  Husserl argues that no other cultural form 
prior to philosophy kept a “culture of  ideas knowing infinite tasks.”45 Therefore,  insofar that 
science shares in the infinite task of  discovering universal or objective truths, it is a mode of 
philosophy. 
2 – The Mathematization of Nature and the Technization of 
Science
The rise of  philosophy as  a culturally acceptable and  influential  vocation in  Ancient 
Greece introduced to mankind the demarcation between relative truths and objective truth, a 
truth-for-everyone.  It  is  precisely  this  innovation  that  served  as  the  foundation  for  later 
developments in both science and philosophy. The science and philosophy of the Renaissance, in 
particular, was keenly aware of the intellectual and cultural products of antiquity. The thinkers of 
the Renaissance turned against their previous – medieval- way of existing and sought to shape 
themselves  in  the image of  ancient  man;  they wanted  to recover ancient man's  theoretical 
attitude.46 Renaissance thinkers  were inspired  by ancient man's  ability to free himself  from 
oppressive  tradition  and  also  his  dedication  to  universal,  absolute  knowledge.  Renaissance 
thinkers, moreover, wanted to apply theoretical insights to practical life; they dreamed “not only 
that  man  should  be  changed  ethically,  but  that  the  whole  human  surrounding  world,  the 
43 Ibid. 292
44 Ibid. 278
45 Ibid. 279
46 Husserl, Crisis. 8
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political  and the social  existence of  mankind,  must be fashioned anew through free reason, 
through the insights of a universal philosophy.”47 I will focus on two Renaissance ideas that still 
permeate  contemporary  scientific  thought:  first,  that  the  world  is  intelligible  through 
mathematical  relationships  and  second,  that  the infinite application  of  the special  method 
would give humankind a total mastery of all existing things. These two notions are precisely the 
cause of our crisis of rationality today, especially in the human sciences.
The  science  and  philosophy  of  the  Renaissance  took  the  Ancient  Greek  notion  of 
objectivity,  a  truth-for-everyone,  and  expanded  upon  it.  Through  a  careful  application  of 
geometry and with the aid of  steadily advancing technologies, the objective world of the Ancient 
Greeks was transformed into a mathematical-objective world. The adaptation of mathematical 
methods  for  empirical  investigation  was  a  paradigm  shift  for  all  ensuing  scientific  and 
philosophical  inquiry.  The  world  became  synonymous  with  geometrical  space  –  infinite, 
isotropic, coherent - and became intelligible in a revolutionary new way. The thinkers of  the 
Renaissance,  especially Galileo and Descartes,  solidified  a deductive method wherein  “every 
object is ultimately attained according to its full being-in-itself.”48 Furthermore, the association 
of the intuitable 'surrounding world' with geometric space was essential to Descartes' dualistic 
metaphysics and, therefore, was foundational for the whole of modern philosophy. The task of 
modern philosophy, as envisioned by Descartes, was to unify all of the sciences under philosophy 
by virtue of a unified method. 
If  we take our prescientific,  everyday sense-experience,  the world  is  given to us  in a 
subjective manner.49 Even though each of us experiences the world in a slightly different way, the 
47 Ibid. 8
48 Ibid. 22
49 Ibid. 23
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differences in experience do not lead us to the conclusion that there are many worlds. In fact, as 
inheritors of the Ancient Greek theoretical attitude, we believe that there is one world, the world, 
from  which  all  of  our  differences  are  accidents  in  regards  to  a  true,  objective  nature.50 
Renaissance thought was preoccupied  with explaining  the phenomena within this  objective 
world. Galileo worked from the “obviousness” of an objective world and sought to conceptualize 
all of its processes in terms of an equally objective system – mathematics.51 There are, however, a 
few problems with mathematizing the whole of  nature.  Firstly,  how do empirically concrete 
things, which have only approximate numerical  values, translate into the ideal  and apodictic 
domain of mathematics? Numbers and shapes are an idealization and cannot be found in the 
intuitively  given  surrounding  world.  Pure  and  exact  geometric  shapes  are  not  experienced 
intuitively; objects are experienced as 'bodies,' which are gradations - “more or less straight, flat, 
circular,  ect.”52 The answer is  that the art of  measurement,  an ancient practice that became 
increasingly more precise over time, served the purpose of procuring objectivity from empirically 
ambiguous shapes.53 Once measured, the empirical body becomes idealized as a geometric shape 
and  can  be  manipulated  in  light  of  its  a  priori self-evidence  as  a  geometric  shape.  The 
development of  the art of  measurement preceded Galileo and its  application was taken for 
granted. 
Secondly, how can we relate concrete empirical things, which only appear to conform to a 
general  style of  being,  with abstract and ideal  entities like numbers,  which conform to self-
evident and necessary rules? Events in our intuitable world are experienced in terms of a certain 
style.  Some  things  are  always  experienced  together  and  have  the  character  of  “belonging-
50 Ibid. 24
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. 25
53 Ibid. 27
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together.”54 The relationship between these things is not accidental and arbitrary; they “depend 
on one another in sensibly typical ways.”55 In fact, if we reflect upon the existence of an over-all 
style to our experience, we discover a universal causal regulation – in other words, “all that is  
together in the world has a universal immediate or mediate way of belonging together.”56  The 
world,  then,  is  perceived  as  an  all-encompassing  whole  –  a  system.  The  thinkers  of  the 
Renaissance would not have been operating in the theoretical attitude if they had settled on a 
vague  consciousness  of  a  world-causality.  Therefore,  in  the  same  manner  that  ambiguous 
empirical  bodies  were associated  with  ideal  geometrical  shapes  despite  the aforementioned 
difficulties, the everyday notion of causality as an ambiguous “belonging-together” of empirically 
intuited things became associated with a notion of  apodictic causality in both scientific and 
philosophical inquiry.57 The idealization of concrete bodies and the application of a more limited 
conception of causality were the tools necessary for a genuinely objective, universal knowledge of 
the world. Armed with these innovations,58 
one  can  produce,  for  everything  in  the world  of  bodies  which  is 
extended in this way, a completely new kind of inductive prediction; 
namely, one can calculate with compelling necessity, on the basis of 
given  and  measured  events  involving  shapes,  events  which  are 
unknown and were never accessible to direct measurement.
Hence Renaissance thinkers uncovered, beneath the intuitable world, a universal and hidden 
inductivity upon which they could operate.
Galileo  took  the notions  of  quantification  and  universal  causality  and  constructed  a 
method for investigating natural occurrences. He sought causal interrelations which could be 
54 Ibid. 30
55 Ibid. 30
56 Ibid. 31
57 Ibid. 31
58 Ibid. 33
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mathematically expressed in “formulae.”59 Once the hidden causal relationships were discovered, 
the  mathematical  formulation  of  these  particulars  became  universal  “laws  of  nature,”  an 
objectified notion of the natural process in terms of the functional dependencies of numbers.60 
Working with formulae in the realm of  mathematics allowed scientists to make “determined, 
systematically ordered predictions...going beyond the sphere of  the immediately experiencing 
intuitions and the possible experimental knowledge of the prescientific life-world....”61 Moreover, 
the use of  mathematical  formula-laws incited scientists to begin the task of  objectifying all 
natural processes. The relations between natural processes, each with their own formulation, 
became a scientific curiosity. After the development of these Galilean methods, however, natural 
science underwent a transformation. Science developed its own technique; “that is, it becomes a 
mere art of achieving, through a calculating technique according to technical rules, results the 
genuine sense of  whose truth can be attained  only by concretely intuitive thinking actually 
directed at the subject matter itself.”62 In other words scientific inquiry now needed to follow 
specific rules; instead of justifying scientific results with observations in the intuitable world, 
scientific  results  could  be justified  in  accordance to  the  a  priori rules  of  mathematics  and 
advanced  methods  of  precise  measurement.  Consequentially,  science,  “from  time  to  time, 
completely loses itself in merely technical thinking.”63 
The ramifications of  the technization of  science are manifold. The predictive power of 
natural laws caused scientists to lose sight of the true meaning of their work. In post-Galilean 
science, the act of  objectifying the intuitable world became toilsome work that was merely a 
59 Ibid. 40
60 Ibid. 41
61 Ibid. 43
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pathway  to  a  goal  -  ideal  formula-meaning.  In  fact,  as  a  result  the  intuitable  world  was 
substituted entirely by the world of mathematical idealities as the real world. Sense experience 
could no longer lead to genuine knowledge about the world without a process of approximate 
idealization. As such, the true being of nature itself became identified with mathematics.64 This 
substitution was “promptly passed on to [Galileo's] successors, the physicists of all succeeding 
centuries.”65 Thinkers no longer needed to reflect back upon the ultimate soil of all idealization – 
the intuitable world. As a result, science's original meaning as the investigation of the world itself  
was forgotten and replaced by a conception of science as a technical craft that values primarily 
predictive power in the realm of idealities.66 This shift in meaning for scientific practice resulted 
in a disconnection from other modes of inquiry into the world itself. Any and every attempt, after 
Galileo, “to lead the scientist to such reflections [on the nature of  the intuitable world], if  it 
comes from a non-mathematical, nonscientific circle of scholars, is rejected as “metaphysical.”67 
In short, Galileo's technization of science brought to it an entirely new character – that of an 
unquestioned tradition.68  Therefore, after Galileo, science diverged from its roots in the Ancient 
Greek theoretical attitude. The truth of scientific research was taken for granted and justified in 
terms of  its adherence to the governing rules of  mathematics and the proper procedures of 
accurate measurement. Science was no longer concerned with overthrowing old traditions in 
respect  to  a  universal  rationality;  science  established  itself  as  a  tradition  and  with  this 
establishment began excluding other forms of knowing the world.
64 Ibid. 54
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3 – Rationalist Optimism Versus Humean Skepticism
The  solidification  of  science  as  an  institution  with  specific  and  exclusive  technical 
procedures directly influenced the entirety of philosophy in the modern period. The Galilean 
'formula-world' excludes all notions of a personal, cultural, or historical life. As a result, reality is 
only the collection of extended bodies. The existence of  non-quantifiable, and therefore non-
scientific, subjective elements in the intuitable world, however, begs to be examined. In other 
words, a conception of reality that completely excludes the intuitable world clears the way for 
metaphysical  dualism.69 With  the  conception  of  nature  as  an  “encapsulated,  really  and 
theoretically self-enclosed world of bodies,” the world splits in two: the physical world and the 
psychic world.70 Knowledge of the psychic world, if  it is to be genuine knowledge in the same 
sense as the natural  sciences,  must be held to the same standards of  rationality:  it must be 
intelligible  in  terms  of  axioms  and  deduction.  A  new  branch  of  science  was  created  to 
understand this second metaphysical domain, the psychic, in the inherited terms of scientific 
rationality.  Physics was given the domain of  physical  bodies and a new branch,  the human 
sciences,  were given the domain of  spiritual  existence.  This is the true origin of  the human 
sciences: they are the offspring of the Galilean technization of science and the inherent dualism 
that it implies. The particularities of the technization of the human sciences will be discussed in 
a later section. For now, it suffices to say that Galilean science incited a division in scientific 
inquiry between the physical and the psychic, the later of which would be taken up during the 
modern period by philosophy.
That the war to rationalize all aspects of existence took place on two fronts – the purely 
69 Ibid. 60
70 Ibid. 60
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physical and the purely spiritual – indicated to Descartes the necessity of an all-encompassing 
rational system. Hence the birth of epistemology with Cartesian 'First Philosophy,' the study of 
rationality itself. Cartesian epistemology sought to ground both the rationality of the physical 
world and the rationality of the psychic world in an over-arching universal rationality. In a sense, 
Descartes sought the ultimate objectification of reality; a reality without any doubts and that is 
truly universal. His method of achieving this ultimate objectification would occupy all Western 
philosophy to the present day. Descartes realized that,71 
only a radical  inquiry back into subjectivity –  and specifically the 
subjectivity which ultimately brings about all world-validity, with its 
content and in all its prescientific and scientific modes, and into the 
“what” and the “how”of  the rational accomplishments – can make 
objective  truth  comprehensible  and  arrive  at  the  ultimate  ontic 
meaning of the world.
In attempting to provide a radical foundation for his new rationalism in subjectivity, however, he 
“accomplished  the  primal  establishment  of  ideas  which  were  destined,  through  their  own 
historical effects, to explode this very rationalism by uncovering its hidden absurdity.”72 It is this 
hidden absurdity that becomes manifest through the course of modern philosophy and provides 
the intellectual context in which science is able, for better or worse, sever itself completely from 
philosophy.
Descartes'  method  of  radical  doubt  was  intended  to  produce  genuine  universal 
knowledge. Although an accomplished scientist in his own right, he was not satisfied with a 
mere  science of  physical  bodies.  Descartes  imagined  a  science of  the  sciences:  a  universal 
philosophy  in  the  same  sense  that  the  natural  sciences  were  a  universal  mathematics.73 
71 Ibid. 69
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73 Ibid. 73
Science and Society: Phenomenology and Its Relevance to Social Inquiry Marcotte 21
Philosophy,  then,  in  all  of  its  endeavors,  required  mathematically-analogous  necessity. 
Philosophical  insight “must stand upon a foundation of  immediate and apodictic knowledge 
whose self-evidence excludes all conceivable double.”74 The so-called 'knowledge' gained from 
the intuitable world is riddled with doubts or possibilities of doubts. As such Descartes, along 
with the natural sciences, dismissed the intuitions as a source of valid knowledge. Unlike the 
natural sciences, however, which take the self-evidence of mathematics for granted as universal 
knowledge,  Descartes'  vision of  a universal  rationality –  a rationality to the second power – 
required that even the so-called knowledge of the natural sciences be bracketed in his skeptical 
reduction.75 
Yet the complete reduction of  all  beliefs  did not indicate to Descartes the truth of  a 
totalizing skepticism; from the position of absolutely no certain knowledge, Descartes intended 
to construct systematically  all  knowledge of  world,  “towards  the gates  of  the heaven  of  an 
absolutely rational philosophy.”76 It is peculiar how Descartes was able to accomplish this goal 
when he puts out of  play all knowledge of the world. Even if  we “refrain from the taking any 
position on the being or nonbeing of the world...not every ontic validity is prohibited....”77 The 
indubitable ontic validity to which Husserl refers is the Cartesian cogito. Hence “no matter how 
far I may push my doubt...it is absolutely self-evident that I, after all, would still exist as the 
doubter and negator of  everything.”78 The  cogito enabled  Descartes  to move from complete 
skepticism to universal knowledge because the ego was the required self-evident, foundational 
axiom. From there, Descartes could to construct systematically all that was lost in the reduction. 
74 Ibid. 75
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Conversely, anything that could not be constructed is to be dismissed as irrational. From the ego, 
Descartes proved the necessary existence of  God and through His insurance of  the truth of 
mathematics,  the Galilean notion of  scientific  knowledge could  be grounded in a universal 
philosophy.
There are problems, however, with Descartes method of radical doubt that undermine his 
intention  to  ground  all  worldly  knowledge  with  an  absolutely  certain  method.  Ironically, 
Descartes'  radical  reduction was not radical  enough.  Both the lived body and the intuitable 
world in general are bracketed under the reduction, but the ego remains as self-evident and is 
thus distinct from the dubious world. Hence the ego, along with purely intellectual affairs like 
mathematics,  is  recognized  with  its  own  ontological  category  –  the  mind side  of  the 
metaphysical dualism. The world and the body, on the other hand, are transcendent and the 
truth of their existence requires demonstration. The Galilean conception of science, as we have 
seen, views the world as an ideality and, as an ideality, the world is intelligible to the mind. It is 
no surprise, then, that Descartes imported the Galilean conception of nature into his universal 
philosophy.  Descartes'  explanation of  the  body side of  the metaphysical  dualism betrays his 
belief in the “Galilean certainty of a universal and absolute pure world of physical bodies.”79 The 
question is  why the belief  in a 'pure world  of  physical  bodies'  wasn't also bracketed by the 
reduction, since, after all, the 'formula-world' of Galilean science is based on the intuitable world 
through the process of measurement. Husserl argues that,80
It  is  obvious  that  Descartes,  in  spite  of  the  radicalism  of  the 
presuppositionlessness  he  demands,  has,  in  advance,  a  goal in 
relation to which the breakthrough to his “ego” is supposed to be the 
means. He does not see that, by being convinced of the possibility of 
79 Ibid. 79
80 Ibid. 
Science and Society: Phenomenology and Its Relevance to Social Inquiry Marcotte 23
the goal and of this means, he has already left this radicalism behind.
Descartes  took  the  Galilean  conception  of  science  –  that  universal  objective  truth  is  the 
relationship  between  logically  necessary  idealities  -  as  inspiration  for  a  new  philosophy. 
Subjectivity only gives us a dubious account of  the physical world. Descartes'  goal of  finding 
absolute objectivity through radical subjectivity was only possible because he imported a notion 
of universal-mathematical objectivity throughout the reduction to explain the physical world. 
Descartes' failure to adhere to his own method of radical doubt by importing a notion of 
the 'external'  world  as  pure bodies  had  a  tremendous  impact  on  the relationship between 
philosophy and science and their respective histories. For philosophy, the introduction of a post-
reduction, world-constituting ego would radically transform all discourse up to the present. Both 
the rationalist and empiricist traditions that followed Descartes were greatly influenced by him, 
some more apparently than others. Every modern philosopher was concerned with “how the 
rational structures engendered in my reason (my own clarae et distinctae perceptiones) – those 
of  mathematics  and  mathematical  natural  science  –  can  claim  an  objectively  “true”,  a 
metaphysically transcendent validity.”81 Indeed, this novel preoccupation was unheard of in the 
Ancient Greek world and ushered in an entirely new manner of philosophizing.82 For Husserl, 
Descartes'  discovery  of  the  transcendental  ego  was  the  “Archimedean  point”  of  genuine 
philosophy.83 
In  particular,  Cartesian  transcendentalism  enabled  and  incited  a  new  brand  of 
philosophical skepticism in the philosophy of David Hume, which, ironically, would destroy any 
hope  in  comprehensive  objective  knowledge  of  the  world  and  would  permit  the  complete 
81 Ibid. 81
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severing of  science from metaphysics.  As early as 1748,  Hume notes the general  distaste for 
metaphysics even among the educated.84 Metaphysics is difficult to read, understand and is far 
removed from the practical  life.  Despite its  difficulty,  Hume seeks to consider what can be 
reasonably pleaded on the behalf of metaphysics. He argues that the obscurity of metaphysics is 
due to uncertainty and error.85 How can Cartesian philosophy,  which employs a method of 
radical doubt, be laden with uncertainties and errors? To start, a radical reduction of all beliefs 
including sensations and the existence of  an external  world  is  so completely removed from 
'nature' that nobody can truly sustain it.86 From the position of truly radical doubt, Hume holds, 
“any human creature...would be entirely incurable [from the reduction]; and no reasoning could 
ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.”87 Moreover,  Hume denies 
the existence of the cogito from which Descartes intended to deduce all worldly aspects.88 
Regardless  of  the  errors  in  Cartesian  metaphysics,  Hume  believed  that  a  healthy 
skepticism  is  a  “necessary  preparative  to  the  study  of  philosophy,  by  preserving  a  proper 
impartiality in our judgments, and [by] weaning our mind from all those prejudices, which we 
may have imbibed from education or rash opinion.”89 Hume posits that there are only two ways 
to  justify  a  belief:  demonstrative and  probabilistic  reasoning.   Demonstrative reasoning,  or 
'relations of ideas', are intuitive and operate with necessary; they do not rely on what is existent 
in the universe.  Disciplines like geometry,  algebra,  and arithmetic fit Hume's description of 
demonstrative reasoning. The truth of probabilistic reasoning,  called 'matters of fact,'  is not 
84 David Hume. “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.” The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. 
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ascertained in the same way as demonstrative reasoning since “the contrary of every matter of 
fact is still possible...because it can never imply a contradiction.”90 Our understanding of matters 
of fact rely entirely on the notion of cause and effect, which through experience imparts to us a 
seemingly necessary connection between two events.  This seeming necessity is not a logical 
necessity, however. An unfounded belief in the uniformity of nature, that it works the same over 
all times and places, established the custom wherein we “infer a connexion between the sensible 
qualities  and  the  secret  powers  [of  causation].”91 If  metaphysics  seeks  a  truly  objective 
understanding of reality, a truth wherein all relationships of existing things, both mental and 
physical, are understood in terms of absolute necessity as Descartes dreamed, then it is a fools 
errand.
After Hume it became clear that the goal of both philosophy and science, in the Ancient 
Greek sense as the identification of  universal  truths,  is in principle impossible.  Metaphysics 
must be committed to the flames,  for it contains “nothing but sophistry and illusion.”92 The 
bankruptcy of philosophy in Humean skepticism, however, did not prevent later philosophers 
from taking up the project of establishing a rational foundation for objective knowledge. Kant, 
especially, took up the challenge of establishing the absolute validity of the objective sciences 
when he asked how the knowing ego can allow its self-evident rational constructs “to count as 
nature with a meaning transcending this ego.”93 For Husserl,  however,  Kant does not go far 
enough in revealing the “deeply concealed subjective ground whose philosophical elucidation 
will...reveal the true meaning of the accomplishments of positive science and, correlatively, the 
90 Ibid.  24
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true ontic meaning of the objective world.”94 The philosophy that Husserl has in mind, the one 
which comes face-to-face with direct experience and examines how the world is made objective 
through the paradoxes of the intuitable world, is phenomenology. Phenomenology is the final 
form the of transcendental philosophy that was originally initiated by Descartes. 
Although  the  birth  of  transcendental  philosophy  permitted  philosophy  to  reach, 
according to Husserl, an ultimate historical form in phenomenology (which will be discussed at 
length in later sections), the historical of development of philosophy had disastrous effects for 
its relationship with the sciences.  If  Cartesianism made possible the complete unification of 
science and philosophy through a method of indubitable reasoning, then Humean skepticism 
offers the absolute impossibility of synthesizing philosophy and science. Both philosophy and 
science, insofar that they seek objective knowledge, are futile. The most accurate description of 
philosophy would be an enjoyable pastime instead of  a quest for truth.95 Science, in contrast, 
certainly has its practical applications but Galileo's notion that science could explain the total 
being of all physical bodies through the infinite application of a specific deductive method is 
absurd. Science can only be the refinement of probabilistic reasoning that only asymptotically 
reaches  truth.  That  philosophy  could  produce  such  disparate  and  mutually  exclusive 
metaphysics, in spite of Kant's genius attempt to furnish a compromise between them, had the 
effect of uprooting any faith in the ideal of philosophy.96
The belief in the ideal of philosophy and method, the guideline of all 
movements since the beginning of the modern era, began to waver... 
the  contrast  became monstrous  between  the  repeated  failures  of 
metaphysics  and  the  uninterrupted  and  ever  increasing  wave  of 
theoretical and practical success in the positive sciences.
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This 'uprooting' or 'wavering' manifested itself in both laymen and scientists, who, in light of 
“the specialized business of the positive sciences, were fast becoming unphilosophical experts.”97 
The implosion of  reason has placed the sciences,  especially the human sciences, in  crisis by 
completely severing the connection between science and the original sense of philosophy. Since 
the Galilean understanding of science as working towards an ultimate understanding of nature 
is  too  metaphysically  presumptuous,  the  developments  in  scientific  theory  after  the 
philosophical failures of  the modern period are largely focused on establishing methods and 
practices that rely on limited metaphysical insights; for all its efforts, however, the new science 
of  the  modern  world  was  unable  to  shed  all  of  its  philosophical  baggage  and  instead  of 
establishing a pure science devoid of philosophy, the sciences that came after Kant perpetuated 
some of the absurd distinctions in modern philosophy and made a few of its own.
4 – The Positivist Method
Ignoring the warnings of modern philosophy, the philosophers of science in the early 20th 
century, largely scientists themselves, held that only an updated and rigorous scientific method, 
the hypothetico-deductive model, could produce valid knowledge about the world. This refined 
scientific  method,  which  found  its  genesis  in  the  intellectual  movement  known  as  logical 
positivism,  justifies  the  truth  its  conclusions  in  terms  of  a  type  of  deduction  of  natural 
phenomena,  despite  Hume's  warning  that  “we  are  never  able...to  discovery  any  power  or 
necessary connexion...any quality, which binds the effects to the cause, and renders the one an 
97 Ibid. 11
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infallible consequence of the other.”98 The essential premise of positivism is that this deductive 
method can produce valid knowledge in any sphere of  inquiry – whether natural  or human 
science.99 These scientists thought that in order for a deductive method of  inquiry to work, 
however, scientific propositions need to be purged of philosophical obscurity and a specific and 
unjustified metaphysical assumption must be made.
There  are  two  levels  of  philosophical  obscurity  that  positivism  seeks  to  abolish  – 
metaphysical  and  linguistic.  Metaphysically  speaking,  positivism denies  any “real  difference 
between 'essence' and 'phenomena'.”100 Positivists believe that “we are entitled to record only that 
which is actually manifested  in experience.”101 Experience,  however,  is defined in the narrow 
empiricist sense of  atomistic sense-data.102 Positivists,  therefore,  do not allow their scientific 
insights to have any other referents besides individual and concrete phenomena since, according 
to the empiricist model of experience, we only experience individual and concrete phenomena. 
As such, reality for positivism is a collection of individual observable facts only.103 Furthermore, 
Positivism issued a revision of language. If the world is “a multitude of empirical facts and states 
of affairs,” then it is the function of language “to copy, mirror or represent these facts and states 
of affairs in the same way that a picture or photograph represents something in the world.”104 
Everyday language, however, is laden with ambiguities. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
Wittgenstein attempted to create an ideal language with which to describe the world of facts - 
one which abolishes the ambiguities of both everyday and philosophical speech.105 Just like how 
98 Hume 51
99 Laurie Spurling. Phenomenology and the Social World: The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and its Relation to the 
Social Sciences. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. 76
100Ibid. 
101Ibid. 
102Ibid.  77
103Ibid.  
104Ibid.  62
105Ibid.  
Science and Society: Phenomenology and Its Relevance to Social Inquiry Marcotte 29
the empiricist conception of  experience is  atomistic,  Wittgenstein's  formulation of  an ideal 
language consists of elementary propositions that 'directly' refer to reality. Any assertion that 
cannot be broken down into elementary propositions that directly refer to observable facts must 
be dismissed as meaningless.  Hence what Wittgenstein says in his preface to the  Tractacus: 
“what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in 
silence.”106 
Consequentially,  both  metaphysically  and  linguistically,  positivism  sustains  a  firm 
distinction between description and evaluation. Positivism wants to describe the world in terms 
of  observable  individual  phenomenon  known  as  facts.  Values  are  not  observable  and  are 
therefore not facts. Moreover, since positivism holds that all knowledge that is formulated in 
general terms that refer only to individual and concrete phenomena, positivism “obliges us to 
reject  the  assumption  that  beyond  the  visible  world  there  exists  a  domain  of  values  'in 
themselves'  with  which  our  evaluations  are  correlated  in  some  mysterious  way.”107 Values, 
therefore, do not tell us anything about the world. Values, for positivism, only108
express the speaker's own subjective,  personal  opinions or feelings 
towards an object, person or event. As such they cannot be counted as 
empirical statements, as either true or false, since they have no factual 
content, and hence cannot be accredited valid knowledge.
In other words, values are not a concern for positivism or knowledge properly so called; values do 
not add anything to our knowledge of the world. Scientific language, then, must rid itself of all 
such  evaluative  judgments  and  seek  to  establish  an  ideal  discourse  of  purely  descriptive 
statements.  In order to rid  itself  of  evaluative judgments,  the positivist notion of  adequate 
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speech must be “impersonal, de-authored speech, free from individual bias and commitment, 
speech which copies nature rather than serving to reflect the speaker.”109 Once armed with a 
precise language of purely descriptive statements that correspond exactly to  'matters of fact' in 
the  world,  there  is  one  final  metaphysical  claim  that  must  be  tentatively  held  for  the 
hypothetico-deductive model  of  scientific inquiry to be possible.  By the 18th century Hume 
already warned later about the impossibility of the deducing matters of fact. Remember: we can 
never prove the necessity of an effect from its cause since it is only through experience that we 
believe nature works the same at all times and places. Despite these warnings, the commonly 
held but logically unjustified belief in the uniformity of natural processes became implied in all 
positivist reasoning. This metaphysical notion is taken for granted. 
Carl Hempel characterizes the hypothetico-deductive model in his treatise, Philosophy of  
Natural Science. He sustains that scientific evidence can be arranged into the form of a deductive 
argument. The premises of  the argument come in two varieties, covering laws and particular 
facts. Covering laws are generalizations, constructed from individual concrete phenomena, that 
express uniform empirical  connections and are taken for granted  as true in an argument.110 
Covering laws are statements “to the effect that whenever and wherever conditions of a specified 
kind F occur, then so will, always and without exception, certain conditions of another kind, G.”111 
Hempel, however, does not feel the need to “enter into the complex ramifications of the notion 
of cause; it suffices to note that the general maxim “Same cause, same effect,” when applied to 
such explanatory statements, yield the implied claim that whenever an event of kind F occurs, it 
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is  accompanied  by an event  of  kind  G.”112 Particular facts,  in  contrast,  are  those individual 
concrete  phenomena that  are  being  investigated  and  can  be subsumed  under relevant  the 
covering laws.  From these premises,  also called  explanans sentences,  positivists like Hempel 
intend  to  draw a  logically  certain  conclusion  called  the  explanandum.  While  the positivist 
program of  establishing clear criteria for knowledge on the basis of  analyzing empirical facts 
with a deductive method appears plausible, albeit metaphysically presumptuous, in the context 
of  natural  science,  there are  manifold  difficulties  in  adapting  this  approach to  the human 
sciences. In the next section, I will analyze the coalescence of the formal human sciences, which 
were made in the image of the positivist project. 
5 – The Appropriation of the Methods of the Natural Sciences in 
the Human Sciences
Galileo's technization of  science produced a clear method for progress in the natural 
sciences. His method formulated general laws by quantifying observable phenomena and sought 
the relationships between these phenomena in terms of mathematical analogy. There are aspects 
of existence such as culture and history, however, that do not appear to be quantifiable or causal. 
The Galilean method of law-formulation is riddled with manifold difficulties when one applies it 
to these non-physical entities. Thus an abyss grew between our knowledge of physical and non-
physical entities. While science was optimistic that the physical world could be explained in its 
entirety, the non-physical, or psychic world, however, lacked a rationality of its own. Descartes 
aimed to bridge the gap between the physical and non-physical by encapsulating both within a 
universal rationality. Although his project was largely a failure, his venture was highly influential 
112 Hempel 303
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for  both  science  and  philosophy.  In  particular,  Descartes  opened  the  psychic  world  to  the 
possibility of rational analysis. Although disparate in so many ways, Cartesianism and positivism 
share a common goal: both seek a uniformity in all knowledge. Whether mental or physical, a 
conclusion is only veridical if it adheres to a particular method. For Cartesianism, the method is 
deductive and  it  stems  from  cogito as  its  original  principle;  from radical  subjectivity,  total 
objectivity is obtained. Positivism, likewise, utilizes a deductive method. This method, however, 
does  not  leap  from  subjectivity  to  objectivity.  The  positivist  program  purges  all  traces  of 
subjectivity from its method and still  seeks to establish knowledge of  both the physical  and 
mental worlds - completely devoid of any point of view.
The primary goal of this section is an elucidation of the positivist conception of the non-
physical  world.  Since the core tenant of  positivism is that the same method of  hypothetico-
deduction works to establish genuine knowledge in both the physical and non-mental spheres, I 
will  analyze how well the positivist program can explain phenomena in the social world and 
illustrate a few inadequacies in their method.  The application of  the hypothetico-deductive 
method on the social world creates social theories that are lacking in meaning and are entirely 
detached  from  lived  experience.  The  real  question  is  –  where  should  we  look  for viable 
alternatives to explain social phenomena? 
The scientific attempt to understand social phenomena “has been dominated since its 
inception by a positivist paradigm.”113 The social sciences originally took up the positivist program 
for  both  methodological  and  practical  reasons.  Methodologically  speaking,  the  positivist 
program  advocated  for  the  universal  nature  of  the  hypothetico-deductive  method;  that  all 
genuine knowledge is knowledge explained in terms of deducing a conclusion from covering laws 
113 Spurling 76
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and individual concrete phenomenon. The application of this method to the social world was a 
matter of course. Moreover, the natural sciences have only gained momentum since the Galilean 
revolution  in  both  theoretical  and  practical  insights.  The  natural  sciences  made  stunning 
accomplishments  and  created  innumerable  technological  luxuries  since  the  coalescence  of 
positivism as a scientific movement. Natural science fascinates our time for its continuous ability 
to transcend the limits of human knowledge and ability. In fact, “the fascination science has for 
us  makes  it  easy  to  adopt  its  scientific  form as  a  paradigm against  which  to  measure the 
intellectual respectability of other modes of discourse.”114 As such, the young disciplines of the 
human sciences in the early 20th century sought academic respectability by associating with the 
natural sciences.115 Emilé Durkheim epitomizes the adaptation of positivist methodology when 
he boldly proposed to 'treat social facts as things,' things devoid of subjective aspect that could 
be understood in terms of  the casual  relations of  quantifiable phenomena.  I  will  return to 
Durkheim shortly when I illustrate his use of the hypothetico-deductive method. 
The human sciences adapted the core tenants of positivism to explain the social world. 
The  logic of the inquiry in the the natural sciences was appropriated by the human sciences; 
both  the  natural  and  human sciences  relied  the  hypothetico-deductive  method.  Therefore, 
positivist  theories  of  the  human  sciences  seek  to  subsume  individual  phenomena  under 
hypothetically proposed general laws. The conclusion of the hypothetico-deductive argument is 
both an explanation of the phenomenon in question and enables scientists to make predictions 
for  that  phenomenon  when  it  is  subsumed  under  the  same covering  laws.116 Furthermore, 
114 Peter Winch. “Understanding a Primitive Society.” Understanding and Social Inquiry. Eds. Fred R.Dallmayer and 
Thomas A. McCarthy. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. 162
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positivist social science adhered to the aforementioned revisions of language and sought to purge 
all subjective aspects from its scientific conclusions. In order to maintain (or achieve) objectivity, 
theories are established value-free - purely descriptive - and thus the conclusions are value-free. 
Consequentially, positivist social science sought to construct an ideal system or model of society 
in accordance with the canons of  clear and ideal speech. This movement aims to construct a 
model of the 'social system', a framework consisting of shared values and norms, which act as 
covering laws, into which individuals are inserted as actors or role-players and are subsumed 
under the 'covering laws' of established values and norms.117 
There is  a fundamental  problem,  however,  with this  artificial  construction of  society. 
Since the language of positivism is conceived as a purely factual and descriptive representation of 
the world, it is an impersonal language. Positivist theorizing is un-reflective: “the theorist has no 
interest in the grounds of his own theorizing, in the process of theorizing itself  in so far as it 
serves to disclose something about the theorist and the kind of  world he lives in.”118 Without 
recourse to first-hand experience of  values and norms, how is a social  scientist supposed to 
create an ideal system of  established values and norms? Through what empirical process is a 
value to be discovered? Even if  we connect a value to an overt and empirical  behavior,  what 
process of validation would ensure that the value to be established is in fact related to the overt 
empirical behavior? In short, the problem is that “positivism is not concerned with how a theory 
is generated, but only with how it is empirically validated, and worthy to be considered valid 
knowledge.”119 
Despite  the  difficulties  of  establishing  positivist  theories  of  the  social  world,  many 
117Spurling 78
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scientists have tried. Let us return to Durkheim. In his 1952 study on suicide rates, often cited as 
a classic of 'scientific sociology,' Durkheim adhered to the positivist program by treating suicide 
rates 'as things.'120 He investigated suicide without taking into account the differences in its 
subjective meaning from person to person, ethnic group to ethnic group. Instead, Durkheim 
analyzed the statistics of suicide rates among various ethnic groups and attempted to explain the 
statistics in terms of  other statistics. He concluded, however, that the cause of  higher suicide 
rates in a given society was “the degree of what he called egoism, altruism, or anomie exhibited 
by the individuals of that society or group, which in turn was the result of the degree of social 
integration of  those individuals.”121 The question is  how Durkheim went from objective and 
impersonal statistics to a notion like egoism or altruism, which are not quantifiable. In fact, the 
meaning  of  these  causes  –  egoism,  altruism,  and  anomie  –  are  not  themselves  under 
investigation and are taken for granted by Durkheim. His interpretation of these causes did not 
find its genesis in how the individuals of the particular social group viewed suicide, but instead 
the meaning  of  these notions  were “drawn from  his own common sense understanding  of 
everyday social experiences.”122 Durkheim never treats the social meaning of a phenomenon as 
the subject of his investigation. Therefore he must 'plug the gaps' in his explanations with his 
common-sense understanding of the relevant subjective aspects in order to make any sense of 
the statistics. Durkheim's study of suicide demonstrates how positivism is not concerned with 
how a particular theory is generated – clearly there was no scientific process of defining egoism, 
altruism, or anomie -,  positivism is only concerned with how a theory is validated.  In short, 
positivist social science is only concerned with the criteria of validation and not the context in 
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which the theorist makes discoveries.  The subjective elements of  both the theorist and the 
people being theorized about must be taken into account by any genuine social inquiry.
We must ask, along with social theorist Max Weber, “what is the significance of theory 
and theoretical conceptualization for our knowledge of  cultural reality?”123 Does the positivist 
tenant,  that the hypothetico-deductive method  can yield  genuine knowledge in  all  field  of 
inquiry, really apply to the social sciences as Durkheim believed? There are two fundamental 
flaws with the positivist program that stifle its ability to gain genuine knowledge of the social 
world. Moreover, these flaws are due to its core beliefs.  The shortcomings of  positivist social 
theories call into question the possibility of both subsuming human action under covering laws 
and maintaining an ideal, evaluation free language. In short, the answer is no – the positivist 
paradigm is unsuited for grasping the social world. It is not, however, completely irrelevant to 
social inquiry. 
Let us begin with the one core belief  of  positivism: that all  genuine knowledge is the 
deduction  of  a  particular  phenomenon  under  a  relevant  covering  law..  The  keyword  for 
understanding the shortcomings of the nomological model is 'relevance.' Laws are comprised of 
individual and concrete phenomena that are analyzed in terms of specific causal properties. The 
establishment of a law brings with it the ability to explain a great number of similar phenomena. 
There can be, however,  phenomena that the application of a particular and seemingly relevant 
covering law cannot explain. These unexplained occurrences are conceptualized in two ways. 
These anomalies can be explained as the result of inadequate methods of measurement and that, 
in  the  future,  these  anomalies  will  be  accounted  for  in  a  more  perfect  system  of  laws. 
123 Max Weber. “'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy.” Understanding and Social Inquiry. Eds. Fred R. 
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Alternatively, these problematic elements of a phenomena can be viewed as 'accidental' to the 
phenomenon itself  and therefore scientifically unimportant “because they do not fit into the 
structure of the “law.”124 A problematic phenomenon appears to be either entirely explainable or 
entirely unscientific without any middle ground.
 Positivist social science has unsuccessfully attempted to explain human action, one such 
problematic phenomenon, in terms of covering laws and causality. Their conclusions transform 
the meaning of human action to accommodate the positivist understanding of valid knowledge. 
Let's  take an example of  a man taking and eating chicken from the refrigerator and try to 
subsume it under a general, covering law. A positivist can explain this action by establishing a 
covering law: that the man, when hungry, will eat something which was first removed from the 
place where food is stored. While this law does explain the phenomenon of the hungry man, it 
does  not  elucidate  why  he  chose  chicken  over  ham,  which  is  a  specific  element  of  the 
phenomenon that defines the act. In fact, this covering law is equally explanatory even if  the 
man retrieved and consumed human flesh from his refrigerator even though the act of eating 
human flesh is an act of  an entirely different category than simple hunger. The point to this 
thought experiment is that “while the deductive model can be applied to the field of  human 
actions, it is only accomplished through a transformation of the meaning of the action.”125 
Furthermore,  the  deductive  model  requires  that  social  phenomena  behave  causally. 
Causal  explanation,  in  its  strict  Humean  sense,  has  three  conditions:  “1)  there  must  be  a 
contingent and external relation between two discrete entities or events; 2) the cause must be 
temporally prior to the effect; 3) there must be a constant conjunction between cause and effect, 
124 Ibid. 25, emphasis his
125 The Hungry Man thought experiment was originally proposed by Alan Blum in 1971. It is quoted from Spurling 79, 
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that is, the relation must be of the form: if A, then B.” 126 Positivist social science conceives of the 
cause of human action as a motive, while the effect is the action that was inspired by the motive. 
In common usage, it is possible to explain social phenomena this way: the man was jealous so he 
killed his wife. Here, the jealousy was the cause of the murder. Yet, upon further analysis, there is 
not a clear separation between the motive and the action; motive and action are conceptually 
related and meaningful. It is “part of the meaning of being jealous that one is liable to kill one's 
wife.”127 Therefore the “motive and the action are not discrete, separate phenomena, since the 
motive is an interpretation of the action...”128 Moreover, there is no clear chronology of motive 
and action. If we continue with the example of the jealous husband, it is nonsensical to ask when 
the jealousy started in relation to the murder. Was the husband jealous days before the murder? 
Minutes? Did the jealousy cease after the murder? The sensibility of a motive is not tied to a 
specific  time-line  in  the  same  way  that  cause  and  effect  are  necessarily  chronologically 
sequential. A motive is more a specification of the variety of action than a necessarily preceding 
psychological state; that is to say it is meaningful instead of causal.129 Lastly, social action does 
not conform to the formula: If  A, then B. If  the husband argues that he killed his wife out of 
jealousy, he is not giving a cause for his action but a reason or motive. This is the case because it 
was not necessary, in the mathematical or strict causal sense, that he kill his wife; he could have 
done other even while being jealous. For example, he could have decided to get a divorce or seek 
mental support. In short, the technical sense of causality, which positivism requires as a criterion 
of  genuine knowledge,  is  unable to describe human actions in a manner that reflects lived 
experience. In order to make human action intelligible, positivism must radically transform its 
126 Ibid.  80
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meaning. 
While  it  is  plausible  to  explain  natural  phenomena  in  terms  of  general  laws,  the 
nomological model of explanation is inadequate to grasp the meaning of human action. General 
laws are intended to comprehensively explain a broad variety of related phenomena but, in doing 
so, the laws become too abstract,  too removed from reality, and hence devoid of  meaningful 
content. The various problems with a nomological explanation of human action, however, do not 
discount entirely the practice of  trying to understand social phenomena in terms of  a purely 
objective facts.  It is only when one takes a nomological  explanation as a total  and complete 
understanding of human action that positivist social science becomes inadequate. For Weber, 
“the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only a means.”130 Laws are 
merely heuristic devices that point us toward the individual and culturally significant – that is to 
say, meaningful – elements of a social phenomenon. 
The positivist revisions of language, likewise, are not tenable. The goal of the positivist 
ideal language was the development of a purely descriptive language that reflects the world itself, 
free from subjective biases and evaluations. The fundamental flaw with the positivist linguistic 
program is that description cannot be entirely separated from evaluation. If we try to describe 
even a simple causal process, there are an infinite number of  causes that precede it. There is 
nothing in the events themselves that dictate the priority of  one cause over another in the 
process of creating a given event. Therefore, in order to describe a causal process we must select 
“a part of concrete reality [that] is interesting and significant to us...”131 The selection of a relevant 
phenomenon as the beginning of a description is culturally influenced, therefore the very act of 
130 Weber 29, emphasis his
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“objectively” describing an event already presupposes a subjective worldview. Furthermore, since 
description requires the selection of an originating phenomenon from an infinity of preceding 
phenomena,  a  description  cannot  in  principle  be  exhaustive  of  reality.  The positivist  ideal 
language tries to make language sensible in terms of reality. As Peter Winch claims, however, 
“reality is not what gives language sense”; “what is real and what is unreal shows itself  in the 
sense that language has.”132 Hence evaluation is prior to description and the basis upon which a 
grasp of reality is possible. The admixture of description and evaluation makes itself manifest in 
our  everyday  language.  The  sentence  'this  room  is  cozy'  seems  to  be  a  purely  evaluative 
statement, since there are no empirical criteria for coziness. Coziness, however, for those who 
understanding the meaning of the term, implies a range of possible phenomena that excludes 
some and includes others: for example, a cozy room would probably not have a concrete floor but 
it might have thick carpeting and lots of furniture.133 Many words are like cozy in this sense – 
these words tell us both something about the world and express how we feel about it. Therefore, 
words can be and are often both evaluative and descriptive simultaneously. 
These difficulties in adapting positivism for the human sciences did not go unnoticed by 
the social scientists of the past. In light of the problems in the social sciences, positivists – in 
particular  Richard  Rudner –  attempted  to  make a  distinction  between  a  context  of  theory 
formation  and  a  context  of  empirical  validation.  Even  if  positivism  grants  that  there  are 
necessary  subjective  aspects  in  the  establishment  of  a  social  theory,  since  both  causal 
explanation in general and the premises of the hypothetico-deductive argument are laden with a 
subjective worldview, the positivist “rationale of validation” does not need to be dismissed.134 The 
132 Winch, Primitive Society162
133 Spurling 112
134Richard Rudner. “On the Objectivity of Social Science.” Understanding and Social Inquiry. Eds. Fred R. Dallmayer and 
Thomas A. McCarthy. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. 96
Science and Society: Phenomenology and Its Relevance to Social Inquiry Marcotte 41
inadequacies  of  the  positivist  method  in  how  it  handles  meaningful  phenomena  can  be 
sidestepped by connecting  the meaning of  a situation to overt behavior.  Hence,  “all  that is 
required for scientific validation of the relevant hypothesis is that some observable state of affairs 
be a likely concomitant of the value phenomenon in question...”135 Once a meaning is correlated 
with a phenomenon, the action can be subsumable under general laws. That an overt behavior 
only needs to be a 'likely concomitant' of a  meaningful, value phenomenon, however, indicates a 
departure from the hypothetico-deductive method and thus is equivalent to jettisoning social 
inquiry  from  the  core  tenants  of  positivism  altogether.  The  positivist  criteria  for  genuine 
knowledge cannot apply to social inquiry because social phenomena are largely meaningful and 
are not susceptible to empirical validation in any deductive sense. 
If  positivism is so bound up in its methodology that it is unable to understand social 
phenomena, then an alternative is required. The problem is that,136 
the form of life of positivism, its world view, basic assumptions, and 
fund of concepts, are so deeply ingrained...that many social theorists 
seeking alternatives unwittingly rely on conceptions and assumptions 
of the very form of life they are trying to escape from. Or else vague 
and rhetorical proposals are put forward for a more 'humanistic' or 
'reflextive'  approach  by  social  scientists,  without  specifying  the 
ontological or epistemological bases for such projects. 
Hence, “a viable alternative to positivism can only come about by positing a radically different 
form of life for theorizing.”137 In the next section, I will show how positivism boxed out social 
inquiry from the domain of philosophy and, as a result, how there is little interplay of ideas and 
both  have  become  mutually  incomprehensible  to  each  other.  I  believe  that  the 
phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty can bring guide social inquiry by 
135 Spurling 82
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offering  new  criteria  for  genuine  knowledge  and  heuristic  tools  for  the  creation  of  more 
advanced and meaningful social theories.
6 – Bringing Science and Philosophy Together
It would be wise at this juncture to recollect the arguments presented in previous sections. 
Scientific theorizing has, over the course of its evolution, dismissed philosophical knowledge as 
valid knowledge. Philosophy and science had shared origins in the theoretical attitude of  the 
Ancient Greeks and the interplay of philosophy and science remained lively and influential into 
the Renaissance times. It was only when Galileo developed a method particular to the sciences 
that a methodological wedge was placed between it and philosophy. The Galileo's method of 
uncovering hidden causal connections and the development of formula-worlds, a worldview that 
took reality as the relationship between bodies and numbers in pure geometrical  space,  was 
refined in the 19th and 20th centuries by the positivism movement to exclude certain metaphysical 
presumptions  but,  in  actuality,  assumed  many  others.  One  such  assumption  was  that  an 
experimental and deductive method is the only means of producing genuine knowledge about 
the world. There are, however, manifold difficulties when one applies the hypothetico-deductive 
method to human action.  Human actions are not subsumable under general  laws nor does 
human action conform to a strict Humean form of  causality.  Moreover,  the strictly scientific 
(descriptive) language that positivism sought to employ is inadequate to truly express the world 
in an exhaustive and explanatory way. Thus positivist has left the human sciences in a dilemma. 
If  the positivist criteria for genuine knowledge are accepted as the exclusive form of  genuine 
knowledge generation, then human action cannot be a valid object of inquiry and is therefore 
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irrational. 
In other words, all social inquiry must be dismissed as irrational because social inquiries 
do not conform to the methodological requirements of genuine knowledge. If, however, we do 
not grant to the positivists that their method is the only way of knowing the world, then there are 
possible alternatives that can explain human action in a more meaningful way. I believe that the 
only recourse for the human sciences would be a return to its scientific roots – in the spirit of 
philosophy and the theoretical attitude. First, I will argue along with Peter Winch that the task 
of social inquiry belongs more to the domain of philosophy than positivist science. The next task 
at hand will be the choice of a philosophy that is best suited to account for human action. Along 
with Husserl, I will argue that a philosophy adequate to describe human action must be true to 
lived experience;  phenomenology can explicate the intuitable grounds upon which both the 
natural and human sciences stand and provide for us the means of  overcoming the scientific 
crisis.  Finally,  I  will  contend  that  Husserl's  intellectual  descendant  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty 
provides an insightful continuation of Husserl's historical-teleological program that can totally 
undermine the positivist program. Merleau-Ponty calls for a new ontology, the “radical new way 
of theorizing,” that can bring both the human and human sciences back down to Earth. 
The task and scope of  philosophy was transformed from its original  Greek sense as a 
consequence  of  the  positivist  methodology.  Positivists  believe  that  genuine  knowledge  is 
produced  exclusively  by  the  hypothetico-deductive  method  and  this  method  relies  on  a 
posteriori reasoning. Positivism reasons from individual phenomena in an experimental setting 
to establish a general covering law, which once established is assumed to operate with necessity 
over all  instances  of  the individual  phenomena that helped  inform the creation of  the law. 
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Philosophy, in contrast, employs a priori reasoning to come to terms with the nature of reality. 
Since,  according  to  positivism,  an  understanding  of  reality  is  only  possible  through  an 
experimental method and a posteriori reasoning, philosophy cannot tell us anything about the 
world  of  fact.  Therefore,  “traditional  philosophy was attempting  to do something  which its 
methods of investigation could never possibly achieve, and must be abandoned.”138 Philosophy 
did, however, serve a purpose for positivism. Philosophy could clarify linguistic obscurities in an 
effort to clear the way for even more complete scientific explanations of  reality.  Philosophy, 
therefore, was parasitic upon other disciplines like science, art, or politics; it served to make their 
findings more comprehensible.  Philosophy was permitted to exist in a functionary role for  a 
posteriori disciplines.  Positivist science felt challenged by philosophy insofar that philosophy 
commented on the nature of reality in general. Yet, “if the integrity of science is endangered by 
the over-estimation of the a priori, against which Hume legitimately fought, it is no less true that 
philosophy is  crippled  by  its  underestimation:  by mistaking  conceptual  inquiries  into  what 
makes sense to say for empirical inquiries which must wait upon experience for their solution.”139 
In other words, philosophical questions cannot be answered by “'waiting to see' what empirical 
research will show us; it is a matter of tracing the implications of the concepts we use.”140 It is 
important  to  remember that  in  its  original  Greek  sense,  philosophy is  concerned  with  the 
elucidation  of  reality  and  intelligibility  itself.  Science is  unable  to  fulfill  role  of  exhaustive 
knowledge production since an  a posteriori method of  inquiry into all aspects of  existence is 
impossible. To generalize from particular instances to universal knowledge always presupposes 
the particular instances as 'real,' when it is reality of the particular instances that is precisely in 
138 Peter Winch. The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. 1958. London, England: Routledge Press, 
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question.141 Language, then, is a focus of philosophical meditation only insofar that language and 
thought relate to the intelligibility of reality, of “how language is connected with reality, of what 
it  is  to  say something.”142 Positivism  is  obsessed  with  the  criteria  of  genuine  knowledge: 
knowledge that is validated by experimental data and is expressed through purely descriptive 
language.  Philosophy,  in  contrast,  is  concerned  with  describing  the  conditions,  through 
language, which must be satisfied for there to be any criteria of genuine knowledge at all. 143
The most basic assumption of  all  positivist science is that a specific conception of  an 
external reality is taken for granted. Positivist social science, however, does not realize that our 
conceptions of reality affect our behavior.144 Hence why Durkheim wrote:145
I  consider  extremely  fruitful  this  idea  that  social  life  should  be 
explained, not by the notions [of reality] of those who participate in 
it,  but  by  more  profound  causes  which  are  unperceived  by 
consciousness....Only  in  this  way,  it  seems,  can  history become a 
science, and sociology itself exist. 
These notions of reality must be taken into account to understand the meaning of social action, 
the true goal of sociology according to Weber. The clarification of notions of reality, which affect 
how people interact in meaningful ways, cannot be explicated using a posteriori methods. Hence 
positivist sciences' inability to handle meaning. Since these notions can, however, be explicated 
though a priori reasoning, social inquiry is really more within the domain of philosophy than of 
science. For Winch, “to be clear about the nature of philosophy and to be clear about the nature 
of the social studies amount to the same thing.”146 In fact, “the central problem of sociology, that 
of  giving  an  account  of  the  nature  of  social  phenomena  in  general,  itself  belongs  to 
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philosophy....sociology  is  really  misbegotten  epistemology.”147 Sociology  is  'misbegotten' 
epistemology because sociological problems have been misconstrued as a species of  scientific 
problem.
The  real  question  is,  then,  which  philosophical  tradition  is  best  to  explain  social 
phenomena.  Winch does not propose a specific tradition or thinker that is most capable of 
handling social inquiry. He does argue, however, that any philosophical understanding of social 
reality must take into account the  meaning of  human action and meaning  is  only possible 
through both language and the application of  a  rule.  Wittgenstein's project in the  Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus  attempted  to  create  a  purely  descriptive  language  that  mirrored  the 
existing world. Wittgenstein did not realize, however, until much later on that language itself 
makes the world intelligible. In his later Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejected his 
earlier project of establishing a purely descriptive language and instead sought to understand 
language as it is actually used. One of his crucial discoveries is why words to retain their meaning 
over time even though words are applicable in some situations and not in others. The logic that 
sustains the meaning of a word over both time and varied contexts is a rule. Rules dictate when a 
certain word is applicable and when it is not. The rules that determine the use of words are not 
established by individuals;  “it is only in a situation in which it makes sense to suppose that 
somebody else could in principle discover the rule which I am following that I can intelligibly be 
said  to  follow  a  rule  at  all.”148 The  rule-governed  nature  of  language  reveals  a  latent 
intersubjectivity to all  speech; language can only exist and have meaning in the presence of 
others. Language cannot be de-authored and unreflective, as positivism had hoped. Language is 
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intimately bound to a speaker and a listener. To imagine a language that was created solely by an 
individual is absurd – as if someone could be first to take part in a tug-of-war.149 Now, according 
to Max Weber, meaning is the ultimate goal of social inquiry. Meaning is established when an 
action has a subjective sense to a participant in a social interaction and, moreover, when this 
sense is symbolic; the symbolic sense of an action “commits the agent to behaving in one way 
rather than another in the future.”150 Just as the meaning of  a word over various contexts is 
maintained through the application of  a rule, the sense of  an action over various contexts is 
likewise determined by the application of a rule. Hence why we can “only be committed in the 
future by what I  do now if  my present act is  the application of  a rule.”151 All  social  action, 
therefore, is rule-governed behavior; “all behavior which is meaningful (therefore all specifically 
human behavior)  is  ipso  facto rule-governed.”152 If  we decide,  along with Winch,  that social 
inquiry is really within the domain of  philosophy instead of  science,  a philosophy of  social 
inquiry must take into account the intersubjectivity revealed through language and our everyday 
interactions with others. Any social theory must take into account the relationship between the 
observer and the observed, so that the rule which governs the observed's behavior can be made 
explicit and meaningful.
If  philosophy is the most valid framework from which to investigate social reality, the 
important question is which philosophy is best suited to handle the complex task of theorizing 
human  action.  Phenomenology,  according  to  Husserl,  is  the  final  form  of  transcendental 
philosophy that was started  by Descartes.153 Phenomenology takes  up the Cartesian task  of 
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grounding all knowledge in a leap from radical subjectivity to objectivity. Regarding the social 
world,  phenomenology aims to remind philosophy and the social  sciences of  their common 
ground –  the intentionality of  consciousness.154 Phenomenology returns to the source of  all 
knowledge, consciousness, which is “a realm of something subjective which is...functioning in all 
experiencing, all thinking, all life, [and is] thus everywhere inseparably involved; yet it has never 
been held in view, never been grasped and understood.”155 Phenomenology, unlike positivism, is 
true to its roots in the Greek theoretical  attitude.  Phenomenology seeks true universality by 
inquiring  into the “purely internal  consideration of  the subjectivity which 'expresses'  itself” 
objectively.156  Phenomenological philosophy seeks all possible knowledge through the infinite 
task of elucidating the intuitable, pregiven 'life-world.'157  For Husserl, an elucidation of the life-
world is the foundation of all rightfully-so-called objective scientific practice. The life-world is 
“the grounding soil of the 'scientifically true' world and at the same time encompasses it in its 
own  universal  concreteness.”158  It  is  from  this  life-world  that  we experience  and  have  any 
conception of truth or falsehood in any scientific sense. 
Above all,  phenomenology is the philosophy most qualified to handle social  inquiries 
because the life-world reveals the essential intersubjectivity of consciousness which is required 
for meaningful  behavior.  Although our thoughts and experiences are uniquely our own,  our 
experiences are also typical or universal in that they share with others a common style, common 
themes, and common significations.159 The phenomenology of perception reveals that the belief 
in the existence of Others is precedes any philosophical formulation of solipsism. Husserl claims 
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that Others are always a horizon of our experience. In fact, our notion of truth is only possible 
through  a  reciprocal  correction  between  our  isolated  experiences  and  the  perceptions, 
experiences, evaluations, doubts, questions, and illusions of Others.160 Likewise, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that Others are a genuine structure of our experience, not merely one of its contents.161 
Furthermore, Jean-Paul Sartre illuminates how the Other is intuited by consciousness not just as 
another external object,  but as another consciousness which can hold me as its object in his 
philosophy  of  the  'gaze.'   Moreover,  the  phenomenology  of  language  rejoins  Winch  and 
Wittgenstein  insofar  that  language  discloses  that  we  participate  in  a  common  body  of 
significations with Others. We do not create language as individuals, but utilize it as a cultural 
object in which we are immersed since birth.162 Hence why Merleau-Ponty says, “there is, then, a 
taking up of others' thought through speech, a reflection in others, an ability to think according 
to others which enriches our own thoughts.”163 Phenomenology is ready and able to handle the 
demanding  requirements  of  genuine  social  inquiry,  if  social  inquiry  is  defined  as  the 
understanding of  the meaning of  an act,  because phenomenology goes beyond the subject-
object dichotomy present in both empiricist and rationalist traditions and attempts to show how 
both language and perception are born in the preobjective life-world, which is “the foundation 
that is always presupposed by all rationality, all value, and all existence.”164
The life-world is problematic for positivism. Positivism rejects the life-world as a valid 
object of inquiry because the life-world cannot conform to the positivist methodology. Contrary 
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to the positivist goal of creating  universal knowledge that is free from the biases of individuals, it 
seems that investigations into the life-world require an investigator to take into account both 
their own biases or the biases of others. Investigations into the life-world also reveal that it is 
laden with evaluations. Since there is no empirical process through which evaluations can be 
confirmed  as  universally  accepted  or  denied,  positivism  cannot  validate  any  knowledge  of 
evaluations, nor would it call information about evaluations knowledge in the genuine sense at 
all. Lastly, investigations into the life-world cannot yield premises from which a conclusion can 
be deduced. Conclusions regarding the life-world have no recourse to formal logic and therefore 
positivism is unable to attain its practical end - predictive power. Consequential  to  the 
methodological difficulties, positivism ignores the life-world altogether. Positivism takes a world 
of  pure  bodies  that  behaves  according  to  a  hidden  causality  for  granted  and  dismisses  as 
irrational  any attempt to elucidate the inner workings of  the human mind  that  cannot be 
explained in terms of biological processes and general laws. By refusing to enter into the domain 
of lived experience, science cuts itself off from its source and the information that can be gleaned 
from the elucidation of  this  source.  Despite that the theoretical  attitude that inspired  both 
science  and  philosophy  sought  to  overthrow  traditional  notions,  positivism  itself  can  be 
characterized  as  a tradition because it  assumes the certainty of  its  method and  denies  the 
possibility of any other form of knowledge production. In demonstrating the reality of the life-
world, phenomenology clarifies the intellectual abyss between philosophy and science. Husserl 
conceived of phenomenology as the apex of theoretical thought that can unite philosophy and 
science again and for good.
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7 – Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, and the Social World
Husserl sought to explain the crisis of science by telling the interrelated history of both 
philosophy and science. This history, for Husserl, contains a 'unitary meaning' that can be used 
to gain self-understanding for both philosophers and scientists.165 It shows us how science forgot 
its origins in the theoretical attitude and how philosophy wrestled with the understanding of its 
own possibilities.166  Husserl believed that phenomenology was the ultimate form of philosophy 
because it was self-conscious of its origins both in the theoretical attitude and in the history of 
philosophy. From “apparent oppositions and parallels,” Husserlian phenomenology was to be “a 
meaningful, final harmony.”167  Phenomenology, however, did not end with Husserl. In fact, its 
popularity led to the birth of various phenomenologies that adhered – some more, some less – to 
his program of  elucidating pre-objective experience.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty was one prolific 
phenomenologist who was greatly inspired by Husserl's program. In fact,  I interpret the first 
chapter of Merleau-Ponty's last work, The Visible and the Invisible, as a continuation of Husserl's 
historical-teleological  project.  In this  section I  plan to show how Merleau-Ponty's  historical 
analysis continues where Husserl left off. Merleau-Ponty provides the ontological foundation for 
a radical new way of theorizing about both natural and human science.  As a consequence of his 
new ontology, the social studies are in close relation to philosophy and are able to account for 
meaningful behavior. Additionally, I want to show how Merleau-Ponty, unlike Husserl, shows us 
a way out of  the scientific crisis by elucidating the grounds upon which a rational  ethics is 
possible. 
Merleau-Ponty is largely in agreement with Husserl's historical analysis. Merleau-Ponty 
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reaffirms that science before the Renaissance “clung to a feeling for the opaqueness of the world, 
and it expected through its constructions to get back into the world.”168 Ever since the Galilean 
technization of  science,  however,  scientists  “see themselves  and represent themselves  to be 
autonomous [from metaphysics], and their thinking deliberately reduces itself to a set of data-
collecting  techniques  which  it  has  invented.”169 The  techniques  of  science  have  become 
sedimented into, what Merleau-Ponty calls, operational thinking. For science, reality is not “that 
upon which we have an openness,” as Husserl would argue, but “only that upon which we can 
operate.”170 Genuine  knowledge  is  what  scientists  “have  succeeded  in  determining  by 
measurement, or more generally by the operations that are authorized by the variables...relative 
to an order of facts.”171 To distinguish between fact and non-fact, however, requires a metaphysics, 
which operational thinking alone cannot produce. Both Merleau-Ponty and Husserl agree that 
modern science has smuggled in elements of the metaphysical distinctions from the modern era.
 The dualism inherent to Cartesianism inspired and incited a transformation of  both 
philosophy and science. Subjectivity is a limitation on possible knowledge for both Cartesianism 
and positivism; we cannot measure the correspondence of our knowledge to the world-in-itself, 
since we only have access to the way things are for us. Subjective phenomena, which are largely 
non-quantifiable,  are  either  translated  into  the  language  of  physical  bodies  or  dismissed 
altogether by science as a valid object of inquiry. Optimistically, the mind is “an invisible 'thing,' 
which is found somewhere behind certain living bodies and...the only problem is to find the 
correct  angle  for  observation.”172 Pessimistically,  if  science  cannot  find  a  correct  angle  for 
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observation, however, the subjective phenomena is dismissed as un-real. Thus, even regarding 
subjective  phenomena,  the  scientist  still  strives  to  be  an  absolute  spectator,  completely 
disentangled  from the  world,  which  remains  as  “the  Great  Object.”173 Of  course,  Descartes 
overcomes the ontological gap between the immanently perceived and the transcendentally real 
via God to achieve indubitable knowledge. Modern science, which works only a posteriori, does 
not have this recourse. Human existence, insofar that science is concerned, can only be analyzed 
in terms of its quantifiable and observable aspects. The application of operational thinking to 
human existence is, for Merleau-Ponty, however, a sign that we are entering “a cultural regimen 
in which there is neither truth nor falsehood concerning humanity and history, into a sleep or 
nightmare from which there is no awakening.”174 This nightmare is the crisis to which Husserl 
alerted us; this nightmare is a world that does admit of any rationality besides the numerical. 
Merleau-Ponty rejoins Husserl when he states that “philosophy maintains itself  against 
such operationalist thinking.”175 Merleau-Ponty and Husserl would agree that Cartesianism is the 
root  cause  of  both  the  tacit  dualism  in  modern  science and is  the  necessary  intellectual 
predecessor of the very means by which to overcome that dualism. Hence why Merleau-Ponty 
says, “our science and our philosophy are two faithful and unfaithful offshoots of Cartesianism, 
two monsters born of its dismemberment.”176 The goal of phenomenology is to mend the wounds 
that have severed philosophy from science and science from itself. Philosophers must fulfill what 
Husserl calls our “functionary role” by learning from the history that he presented in the Crisis - 
the same history that Merleau-Ponty elaborates upon. This history will help science to ground 
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itself upon the things themselves, so that it “will once more become philosophy.”177
Merleau-Ponty's  contribution  to  Husserl's  history  is  the  analysis  of  an  additional 
paradigm  shifting  scientist,  whose  impact  is  at  least  equal  to  Galileo.  Albert  Einstein's 
formulation of the theory of relativity indicates to physics, on the virtue of its own method and 
description, that science must take into account the relationship between the observer and the 
observed.178 There are manifold implications for Einstein's discovery. First, that distance and time 
are relative to a particularly situated entity within the world disintegrates the positivist notion, 
carried over from Galileo and canonized by Descartes, of a purely geometric space within which 
science can make predictions about bodies that move according to universal  necessity.  Now, 
arguments have existed since Zeno that demonstrate the inherent paradoxes of geometric spaces 
as such. What is unique to Einstein's reformulation of space and time is that he did not come to 
abandon the geometric model of space using a priori  reasoning, as Zeno and others had done. 
Einstein relied on observation to show in the inadequacies of the geometric model; physics made 
observations  that  uprooted  its  own  methods  and  worldview.  The  observer  is  no  longer  a 
disembodied Absolute Mind that surveys like a god from all possible angles and captures the 
being of  an object in its entirety. Since the notion of  a complete and total knowledge of  the 
physical world, independent of all human existence, is no longer possible in light of Einstein's 
discoveries, the positivist stranglehold on rationality loosened. The theory of relativity contrasts 
the ideal  constructions of  science against the concrete world of  perception in which we live. 
Henceforth, “for science itself: “objective” and “subjective” are recognized as two orders hastily 
constructed within a total experience, whose context must be restored in all clarity.”179 As a result, 
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Merleau-Ponty explicitly “calls for the revision of  our ontology, for the re-examination of  the 
notions of “subject” and “object.”180
Merleau-Ponty's  task  in  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible is  the elucidation of  this  'total 
experience,' from which our traditional notions of objectivity are derived. Merleau-Ponty claims 
that science,  “far from dissipating the obscurities of  our naive faith in the world,  is  on the 
contrary its most dogmatic expression.”181 Science, like all human praxis, relies upon perceptual  
faith. Perceptual faith is a belief in the existence of the world and from this faith and this world 
we develop a notion of truth and falsehood, which is the foundation of the notion of objectivity – 
a truth valid for everyone. The subject-objective dichotomy, which has led science to dismiss as 
irrational  any  investigation  into  the  'subjective',  is  merely  a  “cognitive  adequation  of  the 
relationship with the world and with ourselves that we have in the perceptual faith.”182 There is 
some truth to the thesis of  subjectivity,  that our knowledge of  the world-in-itself  is limited 
because we only encounter the world as it appears to us, though. The fundamental truth to the 
thesis of subjectivity is that there is a certain immanence to phenomena, which ties the world to 
us with all  of  our finite attributes.  The notion of  know a thing-as-it-really-is-in-itself  would 
require an infinite perception or, as Merleau-Ponty scholar M.C. Dillon puts it, “ a perception of 
the thing from all sides and through the history of its being.”183 He rightfully adds, “this is not a 
possible  human  perspective.”184 The  limits  of  our  knowledge  are  bound  to  our  finitude  as 
temporal,  cultural, intersubjective, and incarnate beings. Knowledge of reality, then, cannot be 
the god's-eye view that modern science hoped to achieve. We can only understand “this phase of 
180Ibid. 23
181Ibid. 15
182Ibid. 23
183Martin C. Dillon.. Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, 2nd ed. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998. 89
184Ibid.
Science and Society: Phenomenology and Its Relevance to Social Inquiry Marcotte 56
[a thing's]  becoming....[since] it is a mark of  the real  to become, to unfold.” 185 Knowledge is 
limited to the finitude of the human observer and by the transience of phenomena. The product 
of  scientific  investigation  cannot  be,  as  the  positivists  held,  eternal  knowledge  of  reality. 
Therefore, instead of  an ontological  difference between  subjective (ephemeral) and objective 
(eternal,  real)  orders  of  reality,  Merleau-Ponty  new  ontology  establishes  a  hierarchy  of 
abstraction: the world of perception, which is the pre-objective and intuitable world of Husserl, 
is  the foundation of  the world  of  science,  which is  an idealized  expression of  the world  of 
perception. Modern science has committed a fallacy of reification by claiming that the abstract 
and  second  order  world  of  science  is  true  reality  when,  in  fact,  it  relies  upon  a  world  of 
perception that comes before it and makes it possible.
Merleau-Ponty's  critique  of  dualism  in  science,  however,  is  not  a  rejection  of  the 
usefulness of scientific investigations. Science does and will have a place in human existence, 
rather “the question is whether science does, or ever could, present us with a picture of the world 
that  is  complete...”186 Science  is  an  analysis  of  the  world  of  perception.  Any  analysis  is,  in 
principle,  to  break  something  apart  into  component  parts.  An  analyst  must  decide  how a 
complex whole, in this case the pre-objective world, is to be broken up and this decision (de-
cision, to cut apart) “necessarily precludes another equally important kind of understanding: an 
understanding of the thing's dynamic life as a whole.”187 An analyst breaks apart a complex whole 
in a particular way that is determined by their goal  – what they want to understand about the 
whole. Thus scientific analysis is just one perspective on the world of perception. That science is 
perspectival instead of being perched from a god's-eye view of reality is in direct conflict with the 
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earlier notion that science produces de-authored, universal knowledge without any human bias. 
Science is not exhaustive of  reality, nor is any particular philosophy. Hence, “expressing what 
exists  is  an endless task.”188 Those topics formerly attributed  by positivism to the subjective 
realm, then, are not irrational; they are simply not taken into account by the scientific analysis of 
the world of perception. It should come as no surprise at this point that one such overlooked 
category of phenomena is the social. It is philosophy’s task to elucidate the world of perception 
in which the social is a reality.
I am proposing that Merleau-Ponty has two major contributions to the understanding of 
social  phenomena.  First,  Merleau-Ponty  accounts  for  human  behavior  in  terms  of  our 
interactions within the world of perception. Our actions are not subsumable under general laws; 
humans act within their existential situation. Second, he proposes a structuralist understanding 
of society that replaces positivist models of social systems. The relationship between mankind 
and the structures of society is what give our behavior meaning. Social inquiry is, as Winch had 
dreamed,  rightfully within the domain of  philosophy and can generate an understanding of 
meaningful behavior. Most importantly, a phenomenological approach to human existence and 
our relations with others enables the possibility of an ethics. Only through the embrace of this 
new form of rationality can the Western spirit finally overcome the crisis and learn how to live in 
light of our knowledge.
The social is an element of all experience. It is “a fundamental structure of experience....a 
permanent field and ever-present horizon to all subjectivity and all action, in the same way as 
the world  is  the permanent horizon to all  perception.”189 Additionally,  society reveals and is 
188Merleau-Ponty. “Cezanne's Doubt.”  The Merleau-Ponty Reader. Eds. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor. Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007. 75
189Spurling 85
Science and Society: Phenomenology and Its Relevance to Social Inquiry Marcotte 58
sustained by intersubjectivity. As Winch and Wittgenstein have taught us, intersubjectivity is a 
necessary condition of  meaningful  behavior.  The meaning of  a behavior is a function of  the 
interplay between an individual's intentions for their action and how Others, who are revealed as 
a primordial structure of experience, respond to it. 190 In phenomenology, this interplay is called 
an existential situation. The concept of situation “allows us to speak of an individual in relation 
to other individuals, and in general terms of social groupings insofar as they exist in the common 
experience and praxis of individuals.”191 Situations are, in principle, ambiguous for a variety of 
reasons. First, an individual's intentions are part of their own situation since “one does not step 
into a pre-given situation like a suit of armor.”192 Second, some situations are a cause for acting in 
a particular manner, while others are passively submitted to.193 Merleau-Ponty uses as an example 
the situation of the proletariat; their situation may spur on action if they are sufficiently class 
conscious and believe themselves to be exploited by the owning class.194 Lastly, the meaning of a 
situation changes over time.  As Laurie Spurling  creatively puts  it,  “What I  may take as my 
present situation, for example, of being 'comfortably off' on $7,000 a year, I might well see as a 
situation of extravagance if I later become a religious convert, or go bankrupt.”195 Taken together, 
these ambiguities require social theorists to invest their own point of view in order to make a 
situation meaningful. Hence, “situations do not exist 'out there' as 'social facts': they are ways of 
understanding people in society which are open to different interpretations depending on the 
assumptions and practice interests of the theorist.”196 The ambiguities of situation are not a valid 
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reason to discount our investigations of them. They are an invitation for more radical theorizing, 
which take into account the relationship between the theorist and theorized. 
Jean-Paul Sartre calls existential situations “the meeting-point of man's facticity and his 
freedom.”197 Unlike the social constructs of positivist sociology, which conceives of individuals as 
role-players  who  act  in  conformity  to  normative  or  expected  patterns  of  behavior,  a 
phenomenological  analysis  of  the  social  reveals  that  an  individual  has  great  freedom  to 
transform his situation and his society by being creative or innovative.198 Now, there certainly is 
an objective aspect to social life, which Weber argued could help foster an understanding of the 
meaning of a behavior. Merleau-Ponty says that we must recognize a “an average and statistical 
significance to our projects,” a significance not conferred on them by ourselves. 199 This was the 
focus of positivist social science but it should not be the end of social inquiry. This objectivity is 
the facticity that Sartre believes is one pole of our existential situation. The other is freedom - 
another structure of all experience that enables behavior to be meaningful and, moreover, is the 
foundation for an existential ethics. Freedom, for Merleau-Ponty, “means simply that there is no 
human nature in man which pre-determines the pattern of his life, and that man's life is not the 
product  of  physical  or  social  determinism  but  a  dialectic  enacted  between  man  and  his 
environment.”200 This freedom is not absolute, in the Sartrean sense of freedom, but incarnate. 
As embodied beings, there are aspects of existence that are not of our own choosing - obstacles 
that prevent us from reaching our goals. Freedom is always limited. Freedom, however, allows us 
to transcend the given. Merleau-Ponty defines man by “the capacity of  going beyond created 
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structures in order to create others.”201 Freedom is the ability to create, to express, to innovate 
instead of freedom from external forces. This freedom gives us the ability to change our situation 
by changing its significance.202203
If  man is the being who is content to coincide with himself  like a 
thing  but  represents  himself  to  himself,  sees  himself,  imagines 
himself, and gives himself rigorous or fanciful symbols of himself, it 
is quite clear that in return every change in our representations of 
man translate a change in man himself.
Merleau-Ponty's analysis reveals to us that freedom is a “rooted creativity,” an ability to act upon 
and transform our world and our meanings. Positivism can only explain human life in terms of 
total  determinism.  Phenomenology  reveals  our  ability  to  respond  to  our  environment  and 
change it. 
Merleau-Ponty conceptualizes individuals not as actors or role-players in a grand social 
system, which forces the actors to perform predefined roles,  but as incarnated beings in an 
existential situation. The hallmark of this situation is the freedom to transcend the given and to 
create new significations.  This is Merleau-Ponty's sociological  phenomenology.  But Merleau-
Ponty also inverts the terms, creating a phenomenological sociology. Merleau-Ponty employs the 
concept of  structure to understand society as a whole. Structure is the most general system of 
reference one can have of a given society and integrates both the point of view of members of the 
society and the theorist. Structure is an over-arching situation:204
the sociologists equations begin to represent something social only at 
the moment when the correlations they express are connected to one 
another and enveloped in a certain unique view of the social and of 
nature which is characteristic of the society under consideration and 
has come to be institutionalized in it as the hidden principle of all its 
201 Merleau-Ponty, Structures of Behavior 175. 
202Quoted in Spurling  121
203Merleau-Ponty, Signs 225
204Ibid. 117. Also found on Spurling 90.
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overt functioning – even though this view may be rather different 
than the official conceptions which are current in that society.
Structures are connecting principles behind a large number of social meanings. An analysis of 
structure, however, must remain connected to lived experience – the world of  perception. As 
such, the point of view of individuals within the given society must be taken into account; these 
individuals must be able to recognize the elements of, although not necessarily agree with, the 
structure about which the sociologist is theorizing. Hence, “the specification of a structure by 
the  theorist  has  always  something  provisional  about  it.  It  represents  the  theorist's  most 
comprehensive understanding to date, but not for all time, and his model is always subject to 
revision.”205 Or, as Merleau-Ponty put it, “there is no question of substituting the model for the 
reality.”206 The tentative nature of sociological theorizing is not due to an inadequacy in method, 
as positivism would suggest; the tentative nature of all theory is the result of our finite Being and 
our connection to transient phenomena.
Merleau-Ponty's conception of  existential  freedom permits the possibility of  an ethics. 
With the freedom to change the significance of one's situation, one can take responsibility for 
their actions and their situation. Existential ethics are contextualist because it does not recognize 
objective values; “all values are context-dependent.”207 In  Sense and Non-Sense, Merleau-Ponty 
writes that:208
True  morality  does  not  consist  in  following  exterior  rules  or  in 
respecting  objective values:  there are no ways to be just or to be 
saved...the value...consists of actively being what we are by chance, of 
establishing that communication with others and with ourselves for 
which our temporal structure gives us the opportunity and of which 
our liberty is only the rough outline.
205Ibid.  90
206Merleau-Ponty, Signs 117
207Ibid.  125
208Merleau-Ponty,  Sense and Nonsense 40. Quoted in Spurling 125.
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To be ethical is not to adhere to any particular set of  behaviors that correspond to objective 
values. Ethics is an attitude of evaluation and self-evaluation that seeks to understand why we act 
the way we do.  The positivist worldview,  that reality is  that which conforms to the specific 
methods of  scientific practice, can never arrive at this conclusion. Human action can only be 
understood as the reaction to certain governing laws and the origin of these laws is outside the 
scope of rational inquiry. In positivism, we are doomed to follow, with logical necessity, the laws 
of  the universe and cannot be held accountable for our actions.  It is no surprise,  then, that 
science has placed our entire culture in crisis. Science dismisses as irrational any attempt to tell 
us how to live. Our inquiries into the social world can only have meaning through a radically 
different way of theorizing – phenomenology – through which the concrete individual and their 
relations to the world can be elucidated.
Conclusion
Our greater Western cultural horizon, the interworld between C.P. Snow's Two Cultures, 
is in crisis because we deny ourselves the ability to answer the questions that we find most 
burning.  Science  alone  cannot  help  us  understand  human  existence,  its  meaning  or 
meaningfulness, because of  methodological concerns. The scientific rationality demands that 
genuine  knowledge  starts  from  observable  phenomena and  generalizes,  in  the  format  of  a 
general law and according to some force of necessity, to the universal character of the world. The 
whole of human existence is not observable since we all have a psychic life that is uniquely our 
own, nor does it operate according to any necessity. Moreover, the formulation of human actions 
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in terms of covering laws comes at the expense of a radical transformation of meaning. Despite 
the difficulties in application here, any other rationality besides the scientific is dismissed as 
superstitious, illusory, or irrational. 
There comes a point, however, when the inadequacies of the scientific rationality must be 
thematized and alternatives must be presented. To find an alternative to the scientific rationality 
is not to destroy it unless your conception of science requires that science be an exclusive form of 
knowledge generation.  Throughout the course of  this paper I  have shown just a few of  the 
fundamental  inadequacies  with  the  scientific  rationality.  These  inadequacies  become most 
apparent when one examines scientific explanations of the social world. We discover that science 
saddles its conception of the social world with its methodological quirks instead of going to the 
root source of sociality itself, lived experience, to establish a conception of the social world. 
Concerning  the  social  world,  we  cannot  rely  on  empirical  evidence  to  justify  our 
conception of  reality. The social is a reality that is built upon concepts and concepts are not 
empirical.  Wittgenstein’s  investigations  into  language  reveal  that  reality  is  not  what  gives 
language its sense; quite the opposite, language makes reality sensible. Science cannot teach us 
about concepts or their application, since a conception of reality must already be presupposed 
before we are able to evaluate scientific expressions.209 Science, therefore, is of a second order; as 
Merleau-Ponty  illustrated  in  The  Visible  and  the  Invisible,  science  is  an  abstraction  from a 
primordial sensibility. While any philosophy, as an a priori endeavor, can comment on concepts 
and how we use them, only phenomenology is the elucidation of the primordial sensibility from 
which we learn about the social, truth and falsehood. Phenomenology is the philosophy best 
suited for understanding the social world because, through its clarification of  the perceptual 
209 Peter Winch. “Understanding a Primitive Society.” Understanding and Social Inquiry. Ed. Dallmayer 172
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world, it can account for the meaning of  social action in terms of  intersubjectivity, situation, 
freedom, and structure. As Peter Winch has shown us, any account of the social world requires 
us to go beyond traditional notions of  subject and object.  Meaning cannot be accomplished 
between  two radically  isolated  subjectivities;  intersubjectivity  is  essential  for  rule-governed 
behavior and the degree of compliance with the rules makes behavior meaningful. In addition to 
clarifying the foundation of  sociability in lived experience,  phenomenology is present at the 
birth of values. Human existence is characterized by a “rooted creativity,” meaning that we are 
simultaneously bound by forces outside of our control and free to transcend these forces. Our 
freedom comes with great responsibility. We are liable for own actions and significations; our 
situation is not entirely outside of our own control. Phenomenology, however, does not go so far 
as to propose any particular values as fundamental to its ethics since these values are not found 
in the perceived world. A phenomenological ethics only, but importantly, requires an agent to be 
self-conscious  of  their  own  situation  and  their  powers  of  transcending  it.  Moreover,  one's 
situation is essentially intersubjective; there is no escaping our responsibility to Others, who are 
a literal extension of ourselves. 
The current crisis debate within the American Anthropological Association is the result of 
an imperialistic cultural movement that seeks to make science the exclusive source of knowledge 
generation  despite  its  inadequacies  in  explaining  some  aspects  of  human  existence.  One 
characteristic of modern science, even social science, is that it must de-authored. The positivist 
program, after all, states that all knowledge must be completely free of personal bias. This, of 
course, is impossible. Language reveals that even the most accurate description is never entirely 
free from subjective evaluation and vice versa.  Moreover,  it is  fundamental  that all  analysis 
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necessarily includes a perspective;  only select  elements  of  the complex whole of  reality are 
selected  for examination  and  deemed  worthy  of  knowing.   Regardless  of  these arguments, 
science is not concerned with the relationship between the theorist and the theorized. Science is 
not reflexive. The scientist's disinterest in their own theorizing prevents scientists, even social 
scientists, from being able to look at science itself as a cultural configuration. 
C.P. Snow was right on when he claimed that “the scientific culture really is a culture, not 
only in an intellectual but also in an anthropological sense.”210 Something can appear rational 
only in terms of  an agent's  understanding of  what is and what is not rational  in their own 
culture.  Hence  when  scientists  dismiss  alternative  rationalities  as  superstitious,  illusory,  or 
irrational, they have the weight of their own culture behind them.211 What scientists do not seem 
to understand is that other universes of discourse exist that are different from their own but that 
can be intelligible and make the world intelligible. These other rationalities provide clear ways of 
deciding what beliefs are and are not in agreement with their conception of reality.212 If a scientist 
wishes to understand the meaningful behavior of a foreign people, then this scientist must not 
hold the beliefs and practices of the foreign culture up to the criteria of rationality for the culture 
of science; surely they will appear irrational. Social inquiry must seek to elucidate the rules that 
govern meaningful behavior, even if the rules are foreign to our Western sensibilities. The crisis 
in the sciences can only be remedied when science itself becomes reflexive and realizes its place 
as a cultural accomplishment. Science is just one window on human experience; scientists “must 
seek to avoid putting scientific knowledge above knowledge obtained through other means.”213 
Only  then  will  science  be  genuinely  able  to  understand  society  and  the  discipline  of 
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anthropology have all of the tools available to it.
The historical  survey which we have undertaken over the course of  this  paper leaves 
knowledge in very different place than where it began.  We can no longer carry around the 
illusion of progress, that through the application of the scientific method comes a total mastery 
of  the universe. Knowledge is no longer moving forward. Moreover, if  phenomenology is the 
entelechy of  a historical  dialectic between philosophy and science,  then the highest point of 
reason is “to realize that the soil beneath our feet is shifting” and that investigations into reality 
are “only trudging in a circle.”214 We might be disappointed with this outcome, but it is only 
because we have been mislead for so long to believe that a positivity of knowledge was possible. 
We cannot establish a hierarchy of civilizations or speak of progress at all, because, in a sense, 
every civilization and all  knowledge goes to the furthest reaches of  the future.  No society is 
perfect, nor can knowledge be total, in the same sense that no painting completes the task of 
painting. 
214Merleau-Ponty. “Eye and Mind.” The Merleau-Ponty Reader. Ed. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawler. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007. 378
